This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

Badham, F. P.

Nelson at Naples; a journal for June 10-30, 1799.

942.073
N426b



Gift of

Lewis F. Lengfeld, Esq.

Nelson at Naples

A Journal for June 10–30, 1799

Refuting Recent Misstatements of Captain Mahan and Professor J. K. Laughton

By

F. P. Badham

London
David Nutt, 57–59 Longacre
1900

PRICE ONE SHILLING

Nelson at Naples

Nelson at Naples

A Journal for June 10–30, 1799

Refuting Recent Misstatements of Captain Mahan and Professor J. K. Laughton

By

F. P. Badham

STANFORD LIBRARY

London
David Nutt, 57–59 Longacre
1900

942.073
N426b

625749

Printed by BALLANTYNE, HANSON & CO.
At the Ballantyne Press

PREFACE

ALL of us who are true Englishmen honour the memory of Nelson, and it is therefore with some difficulty that, in publishing fresh evidence as to the affair at Naples, I also answer, as I am obliged to do, attacks denouncing me as "Nelson's accuser." That rôle I most certainly shall not accept. But just as it is possible to honour William III.'s memory, or Clive's, or Napoleon's, and yet to tell or listen to the truth in the affairs of Limerick, Omichund, and D'Enghien, so it is in Nelson's case: and it seems to me that patriotism and hero-worship are running riot in a field not theirs, when popular appeals about Trafalgar, prejudicial to impartial historical inquiry, are put forward to induce belief that Nelson committed no crime at Naples.

Circumstances now force me to this subject again. When I wrote before (*English Historical Review*, April 1898), bringing forward for the first time in this country the Italian evidence, and Sacchinelli's in particular, it was with the consciousness that other evidence existed which was then beyond my reach. With much of this I have since been furnished by the Marchese Maresca, the chief authority for the period, for whose generous and unwearying kindness (though not meaning for a moment to suggest that he is responsible for the use here made of it) I have no words adequate to express my gratitude. Among the authorities so obtained, and new to English ears, may be noted the *Memoria* of Bocquet, the *Rapporto* of Lomonaco, and the *Mémoires* of "B. N(ardini), témoin oculaire." Above all, there is the newly discovered *Compendio dei fatti accadutti in Napoli*, a minute of the report drawn up by Micheroux for Acton, which decisively confirms the most suspected statements of Sacchinelli.[1] To this fresh matter something more properly my own will be found added, as *e.g.* Ruffo's letter of June 26, and the letters from the rebel prisoners, L'Aurora, Moreno, Landini. Attention is also due to important documents

[1] The Marchese has just published this *Compendio* in the *Arch. stor. nap.*, xxiv. Fasc. iv.

published since I wrote—those letters of Acton's so happily discovered by Signor Lemmi (to whom I pay the tribute of cordial envy), and printed in his *Nelson e Caracciolo;* the *Diario napoletano*, printed in the *Arch. stor. nap.*, xxiv.; and Ruffo's letter of June 25, the first notice of which is associated with the name of Mr. H. C. Gutteridge. Finally, there is to be noticed the forcible re-statement of the Nelsonist case by Captain Mahan in the second edition of his *Life of Nelson*, and in the *English Historical Review*, July 1899, the latter being a direct personal attack upon myself.

Before uttering one word of comment on Captain Mahan's work, I have to acknowledge a very grave mistake on my part that he has pointed out—that of quoting as Hamilton's own a remark which Dumas intercalates into one of Hamilton's letters. The fact that other writers should have verified and repeated my quotation furnishes some proof that there is a ready pitfall in the manner in which the letter is printed; but it greatly increases my regret that, in sinning, I should have been a cause of sin. And now, having made my shrift, I must deal with Captain Mahan's attack quite frankly. The task is distasteful, but his language leaves me no alternative, and it will therefore be best to finish off the matter at once.

1. He half-a-dozen times accuses me of "mutilation" and "distortion" with regard to Nelson's letter of the 26th, which, as he believes, limited Troubridge and Ball's powers on the occasion of their pledge to Ruffo:—

"This argument (of Mr. Badham's) is obtained by cutting off that part of Nelson's letter of the 26th which *limited*—as Troubridge, even according to Sacchinelli, said—the powers he and Ball possessed." - 42

Here there is a triple misrepresentation. Captain Mahan, acting of course in all innocence, has shifted the date of the pledge from Troubridge and Ball's first interview with Ruffo to their second! He has altered their explicit reference to Hamilton's accrediting letter of the 24th into a reference to Nelson's of the 26th! And he is so certain of his facts that he puts them into the mouth of Sacchinelli, whose evidence is quite contrary![1] On p. 24, where I print Nelson's letter of the 26th in full, it will be perceived that that letter has nothing whatever to do with their powers on the occasion of the

[1] *Infra*, 23.

pledge, being written several hours subsequently! And the only excuse for Captain Mahan's inversion of dates is furnished by the fact that, not foreseeing what Hibernian enthusiasm would dare in history, I made no provision against it by keeping the two interviews distinct.

2. On my quotation of Sacchinelli's description of Troubridge and Ball's commission, Captain Mahan remarks:—

"It perverts by suppression and insinuation. . . . It was not the formal signature, but the treating at all that was then beyond their power."

Here again he proceeds from the assumption, altogether his own, that Troubridge and Ball were limited by the letter of the 26th—which was not yet written, and which Sacchinelli never mentions!

3. Apropos of my statement that Nelson promised to land marines "to assist" in the embarkation of the rebels, Captain Mahan remarks that it is

"based upon a letter of Hamilton's, here mangled and garbled, . . . dated 27th June. In it will be found two statements—one that Nelson had promised to give all the assistance that the fleet could give for the service of the king; the other, some lines further, separated by a period, that the embarkation of the rebels having been arranged, 500 marines will be landed to garrison the castles. The two, relating to different times and conditions, are brought together (by Mr. Badham) to constitute a promise of which there is no other proof. The disentanglement of errors like these from the company of partial truths is proverbially difficult."

Here Captain Mahan's courageous precipitation is still more conspicuous. In furtherance of the idea that Hamilton's two statements relate "to different times," he has given the *nautical date* of Hamilton's letter, though in land language the half referred to was written in the afternoon of the 26th![1] In furtherance of "different conditions," he leaves the reader to imagine that it was with the fleet itself, and not by landing a detachment, that Nelson promised assistance![2] He proceeds with "no other proof," overlooking Sacchinelli's repeated statement that the detachment landed did, as a matter of fact, assist in the embarkation![3] And, to clinch

[1] *Infra*, 25:—"Ha concertato coi capitani che i ribelli vengano imbarcati questa sera." The nautical day, as I pointed out in the *English Historical Review* (273), but have now occasion to repeat, was reckoned from noon to noon. Thus a sea-letter dated June 27 might have been written at any time from noon of the 26th to noon of the 27th.

[2] *Infra*, 21, 25.

[3] *Infra*, 41.

Sacchinelli, there is the unquestionable evidence of the *Culloden's* log.[1]

4. One more example :—

"Mr. Badham's next misstatement is easily exposed. 'Ruffo,' he says, 'was *completely deceived.*' Sacchinelli is our only authority as to Ruffo's impressions, and these are his words :—'The Cardinal, *although he suspected there might be bad faith*, &c.'"

As Sacchinelli goes on to state that after an hour or two, whatever the cause of this change, Ruffo was "full with contentment," the above quotation is, to put the matter mildly, misleading. And, as a matter of fact, Sacchinelli is *not* our only authority.[2]

In fine, Captain Mahan has not yet mastered the Italian evidence. In the former edition of his *Life of Nelson*, he passed it over entirely. For the present edition he has presumably been obliged to rely on imperfect extracts. Under such circumstances, there is no warrant for his assumption of a tone of authority. The "stern condemnation of Nelson's traducer" which he pronounces in conclusion, based on facts which are with the one exception false, is unworthy of a reputation which, in dealing with matters inside his province, he has succeeded in establishing so high.

To the patriotic but uncritical Professor Laughton, who has constituted himself Captain Mahan's shield-bearer, it is not necessary to reply individually, for he merely re-echoes the Captain's arguments with a still more vigorous vocabulary. The fact that he has seen his way to reconstruct Nelson's *nautical dates* in accordance with the modern system is sufficient index of the value of his endorsement.[3]

As regards personal polemics, I have finished now, and it is a relief, for the subject of "Nelson at Naples" is one demanding absolute frigidity of treatment. To what is sincere in these Nelson apologetics I desire to render every atom of respect that can be given, consistently with the homage which we all owe to historical truth.

[1] *Infra*, 26. [2] *Infra*, 41.

[3] "On June 26, Ruffo came on board the *Foudroyant*" (*Nelson's Letters and Despatches*, by J. K. Laughton, 199). In correcting himself in the *Athenæum*, Aug. 26, 1899, the Professor makes a similar blunder as to the arrival of the British fleet in the bay :—"It is perfectly certain that *both* these events (viz. the arrival of the fleet and Ruffo's visit) were on the afternoon of the 25th," and he describes this date as being "of the first importance."

JOURNAL FOR JUNE 10–30, 1799

IN the following Journal, one of the main objects aimed at is the arrangement of facts and documents in their exact chronological sequence—the argument as to the execution of the treaty, and the ruse said to have been practised on the garrisons, being reserved for the Appendix. Owing to a variety of causes, the order of procession is a matter not only of crucial importance, but also extreme difficulty; and at the critical point, when the situation was being hourly changed by letters and messages, the minutest attention becomes necessary. There is that pitfall, already mentioned, of the nautical dating; another pitfall, pointed out to me by the Marchese Maresca, that in the newly-published *Diario* the hours are reckoned from sunset to sunset—sunset for June being fixed at eight o'clock; the fact that the time taken by correspondence between Naples and Palermo has to be carefully calculated in each case; the fact that Sacchinelli, the chief Italian authority, mistakenly places Ruffo's visit to the *Foudroyant* on the 24th, and, while representing the Cardinal's *ultimatum*, the Russo-Turkish protest, and the letter to Massa as the consequences of that visit, places them previous to its real date; the fact that several important documents (*e.g.* the three above mentioned and Nelson's letter of the 26th) are undated, have been misdated by historians, and that, until the present, owing to gaps in the correspondence, there was not sufficient material for rectification. Owing to these and other circumstances, the work of constructing a complete synopsis, based on strict chronological principles, remains still to be achieved.

June 10th.—"Instructions" drawn up for the Sicilian expedition which it was proposed should be sent to Naples under nominal command of the Prince Royal. He was to supersede Ruffo as viceroy; and his instructions authorised him and his Junta to allow departure,

if necessity required, "even to the leaders."[1] A copy of these instructions was sent to Ruffo.[2]

June 13th.—Abandonment of the proposed expedition, Nelson, who was to support it with the English fleet, and act as chief adviser to the young Prince,[3] being detained by a report that the French fleet was at sea.[4]

June 14th.—The Prince Royal having been re-landed, the Queen writes to Ruffo:—

"No treaty with our rebellious subjects. . . . No capitulation with criminal rebels who are in their death-struggle. . . . Such is my opinion, which I submit, like all else, to your wisdom and understanding."[5]

June 16th.—The court receives news of the fall of Naples.[6]

June 18th.—But the rejoicing is tempered by further news that the three castles, S. Elmo, Nuovo, and dell' Uovo are still holding out.[7] No exception is taken to Ruffo's proclamation of the 15th offering a general amnesty.[8]

June 19th.—The Queen writes to Ruffo:—

"Among the criminals, the only one I desire should not go to France is the unworthy Caracciolo. . . . Submitting my ideas to the wisdom of your Eminence."[9]

June 20th.—The King, hearing of Ruffo's negotiations with Nuovo on the 17th, and offers of amnesty without exception, writes blaming him:—

"It is impossible that you can have promised an amnesty to Caracciolo, &c.[10] It would do the greatest harm to let these

[1] Rose's *Diaries*, i. 235–6.

[2] *Despatches*, iii. 492. It has been suggested, but surely unreasonably, that Ruffo's powers were "less discretional" than those conferred on the Prince Royal. The discretion allowed to the latter belonged *a fortiori* to Ruffo unreinforced.

[3] Ibid. [4] Ibid., 379. [5] Dumas, iv. 46.

[6] Hamilton to Nelson, June 17 (Brit. Mus. Add. MSS., 34,912).

[7] M. C. to Lady Hamilton, Pettigrew, i. 232.

[8] Ibid., *cf.* Dumas, iv. 76.

[9] *Arch. stor. nap.*, v. 574–5.

[10] Signor Lemmi questions Caracciolo's presence in Nuovo; but besides the old English evidence, we have that of the *Diario* (*Arch. stor. nap.*, xxiv. 196); Sacchinelli (266–7); D. F. Apa (*Brieve Dettaglio*, Naples, 1800, 40); and Ulloa (*Annotamenti*, 150, &c.). The point that he was in Nuovo on the 17th when the negotiations began, and was believed by the King to be included, is not without bearing on the question whether he was included by the treaty in its final form: on the other hand, his quitting the castle may be taken as due to a presentiment that he would be exempted.

To anticipate slightly, the question whether he was finally included depends on the interpretation of article 7, extending the benefits of the capitulation to "all the prisoners" already in custody. If prisoners were to be released, it

rabid vipers live, especially Caracciolo, who knows our coasts so well."[1]

But later in the day the court was relieved to hear that the armistice had been broken by the republicans, and that hostilities had recommenced. Nelson, being now again at liberty, renewed the offer of his services, and Acton writes accepting :—

"The republicans are making continual sorties. The Cardinal seems in a disagreeable position. His Majesty, on this circumstance especially, accepts the kind offer of Lord Nelson to present himself before Naples, and procure the intimation for surrendering."[2]

But it is to be noted that the expedition now arranged was very different from that proposed on the 10th. The scheme of the latter was mixed Sicilian and English, mixed political and military, and one of its main objects was that the Royal Family might reap the *kudos* of the recovery of Naples,[3] and terminate Ruffo's viceroyalty in a manner which would neither show ingratitude nor give offence. At present, on the 20th, it was only a military expedition, purely English as far as leadership went, that was contemplated; Naples having already fallen, there was no longer the motive for sending the Prince Royal or appointing a Junta; and of putting an English Admiral in the Prince's place, or subordinating Ruffo's authority, there is no evidence extant that any idea was entertained. Such a measure would not only have been ungrateful, but also unpopular and (as the situation then appeared from Palermo) objectless.[4]

June 21st.—In the afternoon Nelson visited Palermo,

naturally followed that no more were to be made. This, at any rate, is the scope given to the article in the *Mémoires des Dernières Revolutions de Naples, recueillis par B. N. témoin oculaire.* Paris, 1803, 200, 203.

[1] Dumas, iv. 75.

[2] *Despatches*, iii. 391. In the despatch to Grenville of July 14 (R.O.), Hamilton says that "Nelson was sent to prevent the Cardinal if possible from coming to any terms dishonourable to their Sicilian Majesties."

[3] It was doubtless for this reason that Ruffo received instructions (which, however, proved impracticable) to postpone the attack on Naples; and also explains the meaning of Hamilton's subsequent complaint, "The Cardinal was resolved to conquer Naples himself" (Brit. Mus. Add. MSS., 34,912).

[4] As this matter of Nelson's legal powers, though of mere technical interest in itself, is of extreme importance in explaining the situation that existed at Naples, June 24–30, a statement of the case becomes necessary.

Overlooking the considerations above mentioned, Captain Mahan boldly assumes the identity of this expedition of the 21st with that planned on the 10th, and argues that, as Nelson was now going alone, he *naturally* succeeded to the Prince's position! If such had been the case, Ruffo's Vicar-Generalship would have ceased on Nelson's arrival! In any case, a formal transfer of the

and, after a hurried council, started for Naples, the Hamiltons accompanying him.[1] The nature of Nelson's commission may be inferred from the Queen's letter to Ruffo, which was sent off at the same time :—

"Nelson will summon the castles to surrender, and if they refuse he will force them, obstinacy being now out of place and injurious. . . . One can treat with St. Elmo, which is in the hands of the French; but the other two castles, if they do not surrender immediately and without condition to the summons of Lord Nelson, will be taken by storm, and treated as they deserve. . . . The news of Caracciolo's flight grieves me excessively."[2]

June 23rd.—When about forty miles from Naples, Nelson received false intelligence that a twenty-one days' armistice had been concluded, at the conclusion of which, if unrelieved by the French fleet, the garrisons were to surrender and sail for France.[3] He at once sat down, and, reasonably enough under the presumed circumstances, drew up his *Observations*, to the effect that as the French fleet might terminate the armistice, so might the English fleet.[4] At the same time, he wrote off to Palermo informing the court of what he had

Prince's power to Nelson would have been necessary, and no such instrument is forthcoming.

It is true that the Prince had been ordered to conform in all things to Nelson's advice, and that the unmeasured confidence then expressed (*Despatches*, iii. 492) left no doubt as to what the King would have done on the 21st, if he had foreseen what Nelson would find; but there is, as we shall find (*infra*, 29, 33), the positive fact, which Captain Mahan strangely ignores, that on the 25th, and still more completely on the 27th, he made up the deficiency by a formal conveyance of supreme legal authority. How can it be argued, in the face of this conveyance, that Nelson's power was already complete?

Hitherto Captain Mahan has argued that Nelson's authority must have been complete, because Acton subsequently alluded to his "power to arrest the Cardinal" (*Despatches*, vii. ad. 186). But, as I pointed out in the *English Historical Review*, that power could only have been despatched on June 27; and this view has now been finally confirmed by Signor Lemmi's discovery of the warrants (Lemmi, 96, &c.). Under these circumstances, Captain Mahan re-asserts that Nelson arrived with authority to arrest, but he naturally gives no authority for his belief.

[1] In his unofficial note to Grenville, July 14 (R.O.), Hamilton says that his wife went by the Queen's special request. *Cf.* Morrison Letters, 411, "The Queen sent me as her deputy."

[2] Dumas, iv. 76. Acton, on the 24th, defines Nelson's commission similarly :—"The kingdom has been all reconquered under the command of Cardinal Ruffo, including the capital, except the castles, which have twice tried to capitulate, . . . but the English squadron will force immediate surrender" (Lemmi, 87).

[3] Acton to Hamilton (Lemmi, 92–3).

[4] *Despatches*, iii. 384–6.

heard,[1] adding that he would annul the armistice as soon as he arrived.[2]

June 24th.—Nelson arrived at Naples in the afternoon, and learnt before entering the bay from the Governor of Procida that it was no twenty-one days' armistice, but a regular treaty, now thirty-six hours old, that had been concluded, according to which the garrisons of Nuovo and dell' Uovo had the immediate option of returning to their homes or sailing with their property to Toulon.[3]

3 P.M.—Nelson signals that the flag of truce is to be hauled down.[4]

4 P.M.—Foote, hitherto commander of the English squadron in the bay, comes on board with a copy of the treaty, and explains the circumstances of its conclusion and of his participation.[5]

5 P.M.—Nelson sends off Troubridge and Ball to Ruffo with a copy of his *Observations*. They also carried the following letter of Hamilton's :—

"5 P.M.

"My Lord Nelson begs me to inform your Eminence that he has received from Captain Foote, commander of the frigate *Seahorse*, a copy of the capitulation which your Eminence has judged it expedient to make with the officers in command of the castles of St. Elmo, Castello Nuovo, and Castello dell' Uovo; that he entirely disapproves of these, and that he is quite resolved not to remain neuter with the respectable force which he has the honour to command;[6] that he has detached to meet your

[1] Acton to Hamilton (Lemmi, 92–3).

[2] "Cardinal Ruffo had accorded a capitulation to the Chateaux of Naples, and to the Jacobins of the country, but it has been rejected by the King and by Nelson."—Cav. Balbo to Count Chialamberto, Palermo, June 26 (*Archivi piemontesi*). By way of caution, it may be noted that the word "capitulation" here applies rather to the imaginary twenty-one days' armistice than to the capitulation proper. How Nelson dealt with the latter was not known at Palermo till June 27 (Lemmi, 95–6).

[3] Professor Laughton asserts in his *Life of Nelson* that it was "on anchoring," *i.e.* between eight and nine P.M. (*Foudroyant's* log), that Nelson first heard of the existence of the treaty. Comment is needless.

[4] *Mutine's* log.

[5] Foote's *Vindication*, 21. There is abundant evidence that the rebels had made an express point of getting the signatures of the representatives of the allied powers, and Foote's signature in particular, being distrustful of Sicilian faith (vide *e.g. Mémoires* of "B. N. témoin oculaire," 199). Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see the force of Nicolas' laboured argument that Foote must have intended to sign in some other capacity than that in which he was invited; the ground for such suggestion being that Nelson, writing to Davidson, subsequently averred that "There has been nothing promised by a British officer which his Sicilian Majesty has not complied with."

[6] The sentiment thus expressed is illustrated by the following extract from Nelson's autobiography: "As his Sicilian Majesty is pleased to say, I reconquered his kingdom" (*Despatches*, i. 14).

Eminence the captains Troubridge and Ball, commanding his Majesty's vessels *Culloden* and *Alexander*. These captains are fully informed of Lord Nelson's sentiments, and will have the honour to explain them to your Eminence. My Lord hopes that the Cardinal Ruffo will agree with him, and that to-morrow at the break of day he will be able to act in concert with your Eminence. The object of each cannot but be the same; that is to say, to reduce the common enemy, and to make the rebellious subjects of his Sicilian Majesty submit to his clemency."[1]

Troubridge and Ball failed completely in their mission; and at the end of the *Observations* we find a note of Nelson's, "Read and explained and rejected by the Cardinal."[2] One has some difficulty to get inside Nelson's reasoning, in regarding the argument of the *Observations* as still applicable, now that he knew that it was no terminable armistice, but a fixed treaty that had been concluded. It would seem that as the treaty had not yet received the royal approbation, which he conceived it required, he wished Ruffo to regard it as incomplete, and therefore terminable, and to accept himself as exponent of the royal intention.

Ruffo's attitude on the evening of the 24th is further illustrated by his interview with Wade, a free-lance who was trying to make himself useful to Nelson :—

"In order to avoid the danger that might happen to the city by Lord Nelson firing on the Castel dell' Uovo and the Castel Nuovo, still in possession of the Jacobins, upon my arrival here I applied to Cardinal Ruffo offering my services, in hopes that he would condescend to grant me a few troops in order to take possession of those castles; but he not only declined it, but absolutely refused that any of his Majesty's subjects should be employed in breaking a treaty authorised with his signature."[3]

At the same time Nelson and the Hamiltons sent off letters to Palermo, in which they

"painted exactly the state of affairs, and the confusion at Naples, . . . and recommending to their Majesties to show themselves in the bay of Naples as soon as possible, by which means and by that alone all would be calmed, and the Cardinal's dangerous power die of a natural death."[4]

[1] Rose's *Diaries*, i. 236–7; Sacchinelli's Appendix.
[2] *Despatches*, iii. 384–6.
[3] Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34,912.
[4] Hamilton to Grenville, July 14. From Acton's reply (Lemmi, 97) it would seem that Nelson also hinted at treason on Ruffo's part. *Cf.* Malaspina's *Osservazioni* (34) and Sacchinelli (257).

June 25th, A.M.—Further defining the relationship to Ruffo, one next notices Nelson's letter to Duckworth:—

"As you will believe, the Cardinal and myself have begun our career by a complete difference of opinion. He will send the rebels to Toulon—I say they shall not go. He thinks one house in Naples more to be prized than his sovereign's honour. Troubridge and Ball are gone to the Cardinal, for him to read my Declaration to the French and rebels. . . ."[1]

The *Declaration* referred to is as follows:—

"*Declaration sent to the Neapolitan Jacobins in the Castles of Uovo and Nuovo, June* 25.

"Rear-Admiral Lord Nelson, K.B., Commander of his Britannic Majesty's fleet in the bay of Naples, acquaints the rebellious subjects of his Sicilian Majesty in the castles of Uovo and Nuovo that he will not permit them to embark or quit those places. They must surrender to his Majesty's royal mercy.—NELSON."

"*Summons sent to the Castle S. Elmo, June* 25.

"SIR,—His Eminence Cardinal Ruffo and the Commanding Officer of the Russian Army having sent you a summons to surrender, I acquaint you that unless the terms are acceded to within two hours, you must take the consequences, as I shall not agree to any others.—I am, Sir, your most obedient servant, NELSON."[2]

The result of this fresh mission of Troubridge and Ball's is best told in Nelson's own words:—

"His Eminence said that he would send no papers;[3] that if I pleased I might break the armistice, for that he was tired of his situation. Captain Troubridge then asked his Eminence this plain question, 'If Lord Nelson breaks the armistice, will your Eminence assist him in his attack on the castles?' His answer was clear, 'I will neither assist him with men or guns.'"[4]

The next thing to be noticed is the protest which Baillie and Achmet, the Russian and Turkish co-signa-

[1] *Despatches*, iii. 387. [2] Ibid., 386.

[3] This, by the way—though afterwards repeated by Nelson—is inaccurate as regards the summons to the French in S. Elmo, between whom and the treaty-covered patriots in Nuovo and dell' Uovo Ruffo naturally drew a deep line of distinction. Thus we find Méjan writing to Micheroux on the 26th:—"Monsieur, the reply I made to *your previous summons* has made you sufficiently aware of my intentions" (Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34,944). Captain Mahan is astray when he denounces the treaty on the ground that it left S. Elmo indefinitely in French hands to await the arrival of the French fleet.

[4] *Despatches*, iii. 392–3.

tories of the treaty, drew up at Ruffo's instigation, and which was carried to Nelson by Micheroux:—

"That the treaty of the capitulation of the castles of Naples was useful, necessary, and honourable to the arms of the King of the Two Sicilies, and of the allied powers, the King of Great Britain, the Emperor of all the Russias, and the Sublime Porte, since without further shedding of blood that treaty terminated the deadly civil and national war, and facilitated the expulsion of the common foreign enemy from the kingdom. That as it was solemnly concluded by the representatives of the said powers, it would be committing an abominable outrage against public faith if it should not be executed exactly, or if it should be violated;" and praying Nelson to consent to recognise it, they protested that they were firmly resolved to execute it religiously, and denouncing as responsible before God and the world whoever should dare to impede the execution.[1]

It was this protest, so it would seem, which led Nelson to refuse any further negotiation with Micheroux. Declaring that he would have the same respect for the Emperor of Russia's honour as for that of his own sovereign, he intimated to Ruffo, through Hamilton, that he was "quite determined to have nothing to do with any one except your Eminence."[2]

P.M.—Accordingly, in the afternoon,[3] "after much negotiation," writes Nelson to Keith, "his Eminence desired me to come on board to speak with me on his situation. I used every argument in my power to convince him that the treaty and armistice was at an end by the arrival of the fleet,[4] but an Admiral is no match in talking with a Cardinal. I therefore gave him my *Opinion* in writing, viz. 'Rear-Admiral Lord Nelson, who arrived in the bay of Naples on the 24th June with the British

[1] Sacchinelli, 251. The difficulty as to the exact date of this protest has been already mentioned (*supra*, 9). Nelson's refusal to treat any more with Micheroux seems to fix the proper occasion.

[2] Rose's *Diaries*, i. 237.

[3] The date is fixed by the *Foudroyant's* log. To preclude mistake I may point out that several of these logs, among them the *Foudroyant's*, are in two parts.

[4] Captain Mahan is certainly in advance of facts when he asserts that Nelson always used the terms "armistice" and "treaty" correctly and distinctly. (*a*) He referred to the treaty by the extraordinary title "treaty of armistice" (*Despatches*, iii. 384). (*b*) He sent Davison his *Observations* on the imaginary twenty-one days' armistice, and, avoiding the word "treaty," left Davison to infer that it was only "the infamous armistice entered into by the Cardinal" that he had had to deal with (ibid., iv. 232). (*c*) In the above-quoted letter to Keith he had written:—"Having on my way received letters informing me that an infamous armistice was entered into, to which Foote had put his name, I instantly made the signal to annul the truce;" and he

fleet, found a treaty entered into with the rebels, which he is of opinion ought not to be carried into execution without the approbation of his Sicilian Majesty, Earl St. Vincent—Lord Keith.'"[1]

From other sources we learn that the interview was stormy;[2] and nowhere[3] is there the slightest hint of any ultimate yielding on Ruffo's part.[4] It will be perceived that at first Nelson still clung to the argument of the *Observations;* and then, abandoning that line (this is, at any rate, the last time we directly hear of it), apparently takes up a second position, that the treaty ought to remain suspended pending the royal decision.[5] Apparently,

had dropped no hint as to this information proving incorrect; so that in the subsequent expression "treaty and armistice" Keith could only take the former term as equivalent to *treating*.

Apropos of straightforwardness, it may, by-the-bye, be added that Nelson simply informs Keith of Caracciolo's execution on a Sicilian ship, and Keith, all in the dark, replied, "Advise those Neapolitans not to be too sanguinary; cowards are always cruel" (Ibid., iv. 419).

[1] *Despatches*, iii. 392–3.

[2] Harrison's *Life of Nelson*:—"The dispute lasted two hours. . . . The manly sentiments of his Lordship made no impression on the Cardinal. He would not listen to reason. . . . Lord Nelson suddenly put an end to the argument by remarking that since he found an Admiral was no match for a Cardinal in talking, he would try the effect in writing."

[3] Neither in Harrison's account (which is virtually Lady Hamilton's), or Nelson's, or Hamilton's (Despatch to Grenville, July 14), or Ruffo's (as reported by Sacchinelli). The only discrepancy between the four accounts is that Sacchinelli omits the *Opinion*, on which Nelson lays such stress. This may be accounted for by the fact that Ruffo regarded it merely as the personal opinion of a man who had no moral or legal right to enforce it. The exact value of the *Opinion* at this particular moment depends on the question of Nelson's legal powers, which has already been examined.

[4] In this connection Captain Mahan relies on Acton's expression of Aug. 1:—"The Cardinal yielded" (*Despatches*, vii. ad. 186); but the context of that expression makes it more probable that Acton refers to a later date. For he couples it with the letters authorising the Cardinal's arrest, which, as we know now, only arrived on June 30 (*infra*, 33).

With this letter of Aug. 1 it is interesting to compare another addressed to Hamilton:—"I see with pleasure that this temper and moderation on your side has kept the Cardinal from taking the *mord aux dents*" (Brit. Mus. Eg. MSS., 2640, 313).

[5] The phrase "ought not to be carried into execution without the approbation of his Sicilian Majesty" most naturally implies the converse, that until the King had decided, the *status quo* would be maintained. Such is Hamilton's interpretation in his despatch of July 14:—

"Lord Nelson assured the Cardinal at the same time that he did not mean to do anything contrary to his Eminence's treaty; but as that treaty could not be valid until it had been ratified by his Sicilian Majesty, his Lordship's meaning was only to secure his Majesty's rebellious subjects until his pleasure should be known."

Hamilton is, indeed, frequently inaccurate, but it seems more natural to accept his interpretation than to make the *Opinion* one-sided, cutting in one direction and not in the other. Such is Professor Villari's judgment (*Nuova Antologia*, February 1899).

And here to digress for a moment as to the character of Hamilton's in-

Nelson also informed Ruffo that he should send in the *Declaration* on his own account; and Ruffo, conformably with his speech to Troubridge and Ball, told Nelson politely to follow his own course.[1]

When Ruffo returned from his interview with Nelson, convinced of the Admiral's intentions, he at once made every effort in his power to execute the treaty. He seems to have started by making arrangements for the departure of the patriots of S. Martino (an outpost of S. Elmo), to whom the benefits of the capitulation had been extended;[2] and a considerable number, perhaps all of them, decided simply to walk out into Naples.[3]

Ruffo's next step was to write to General Massa, Governor of Nuovo. He informed him

"that although he, and the representatives of the allied powers, held the treaty of capitulation as sacred and inviolable, nevertheless the Rear-Admiral of the English Squadron did not wish to recognise it; and as the garrisons were at liberty to avail themselves of article 5 of the capitulation, following the example of the patriots of S. Martino, who had all quitted by land, so he made this offer in order that, on consideration that the English commanded at sea, the garrisons might choose as pleased them best."[4]

accuracy. Signor Lemmi is undoubtedly right in correcting my assumption that it was due to carelessness. There is a distinct method in it. In order to give a *venit-vidit-vicit* character to Nelson's procedure, he exaggerates the amount of execution given to the treaty, and represents everything as changed by Nelson's arrival instantaneously. Nelson seizes the rebel chiefs "immediately," sends marines into the castles "at once," and hangs Caracciolo on the morrow of his arrival. The detection of the motive and drift of Hamilton's inaccuracy increases one's confidence in other parts of the despatch.

[Micheroux's *Compendio* shows that Ruffo's estimate of the *Opinion* was the same as Hamilton's:—"He gave the Cardinal a declaration in writing that the capitulation ought not to have effect *until* it should be approved by his Majesty" (*Arch. stor. nap.*, xxiv. 460.]

[1] *Infra*, 20. [2] "B. N.," 198.

[3] Ibid., 204:—"They came in the midst of an escort to Pizzofalcone, where they were given the choice of stopping or going. Signorelli with some others announced his intention of returning to his family; and, having mounted the royal cockade, they entered Naples without difficulty. The others remained for embarkation during the night." B. N.'s testimony is most uneven, and as to dates after June 23rd he is all at sea—to be accounted for perhaps by some peculiarity of his position or that of his informants at this particular time. But as to S. Martino, his evidence is partially confirmed by Ruffo's letter to Massa.

[4] Sacchinelli, 252–3. It has been recently argued that Ruffo's offer was merely to save his face, and that a retreat through Italy Xenophonwise was impracticable. But though Ruffo seemingly left this choice open to Massa, the analogy of S. Martino shows that it was rather a return to Naples that he suggested.

To this letter Massa, evidently misappreciating Ruffo's generous intentions, replied as follows :—

"We have given your letter the interpretation which it deserves. Standing firm to our duties, we shall religiously observe the articles of the treaty agreed to, persuaded that an equal obligation ought to bind all the contracting parties who have solemnly intervened. For the rest, we are not to be surprised or intimidated, and shall resume the hostile attitude if it happens that you constrain us forcibly. Whereas our capitulation was dictated by the commander of S. Elmo, you will be good enough to at once place at our disposal an escort to accompany our envoy to that fort, to confer with the French commander, and to give you then a more precise reply."[1]

It would seem that the escort was granted,[2] and that Méjan, commander of S. Elmo, recommended acceptance of Ruffo's offer. At any rate, *at* 7.30 *p.m.*,

"the surrender of the castles Nuovo and dell' Uovo agreed upon with the commander of S. Elmo was announced, and by a crier with a trumpet, the public were warned not to molest either the persons or the property of all those who should issue from the castles and their environs, not even with words, under penalty of being shot."[3]

In spite of all this effort of Ruffo's, the offer to the castles resulted in miserable failure,[4] and to render his position still more painful, there was an evening attack from S. Elmo. Under these circumstances, he wrote to Nelson as follows :—

"The letter to the castles[5] must have gone by this time, and, if there is any hope of their surrendering at discretion, it may succeed, because they see the augmentation of force; and when-

[1] Sacchinelli, 252–3. [2] See Marshal Micheroux's letter, *infra*, 21.

[3] *Diario*, June 25. The date of this proclamation, "alle ore 23 e mezza," is most important. The correspondence with Massa may possibly have taken place earlier in the day, though Massa's reference to intimidation and forcible constraint point rather to Nelson's *Declaration* having been already received; but the proclamation is thus decisively shown to be posterior to the interview with Nelson. If the correspondence with Massa were earlier, the proclamation by itself proves that Ruffo's disposition was still unchanged. Up to this moment there is on his part no sign of "yielding."

[4] *Cf.* "B. N.," 204 :—"Few patriots went back to their homes." The fact seems to be that the non-emigrants had for the most part quitted already. From the *verbale* (*infra*, 26) one learns that there were only thirty-four non-emigrants left in dell' Uovo on the 26th.

[5] It is worth note, as the Marchese Maresca has pointed out in the *Piedigrotta*, that Captain Mahan is wrong in taking this "lettera ai castelli" to be some letter of Ruffo's, sent by himself, and *equivalent* to Nelson's *Declaration*. It is the *Declaration* itself, sent by Nelson entirely in his own name, as is clear from Nelson's subsequent description :—"On his (Ruffo's) refusal

ever they wish to attack, it will be well that they find us in force to destroy them. I implore then your Excellency to disembark 1200 men, whom it would be well to put in a condition to go then to S. Elmo, and therefore I offer for their accommodation my house, which is large and empty, situated at the largo dello Spirito Santo: it is called the Palazzo della Bagnara, and will be out of the way of bombs, which I mention for the repose of the soldiers. I hope that your Excellency will grant me this favour, since this evening there have already been hostilities on the part of S. Elmo, and there is no time to lose. I remain with the greatest respect, &c."[1]

The garrisons, as Ruffo had anticipated, rejected Nelson's *Declaration*,[2] their attitude, so far as one knows,

to send in a joint declaration to the French and rebels, I sent in my note" (*Despatches*, iv. 232). "I put aside, and sent them notice of it, the infamous treaty" (ibid., iii. 520).

And now arises the important question, Does this somewhat difficult letter of Ruffo's indicate a *yielding* on his part? Captain Mahan answers in the affirmative, but to this view there is grave objection. Ruffo had stuck to his resolution not to send the *Declaration* in himself. If the rebels were foolish enough to submit to it, that was their affair. If they were excited by it into hostilities—as the example of S. Elmo warned him they might be—he would combine with Nelson in destroying them; and with the imminent danger from S. Elmo, much more than from the other two castles, in his mind, he begs Nelson to land large reinforcements. But the courteous tone of the letter does not alter the fact that, while quite ready to co-operate at once in attacking S. Elmo, there is not a word committing him to any attack on the other two castles if the *Declaration* were rejected. On the morrow we shall find that Ruffo by all appearances occupies his previous position. The impression left on my mind is that on the evening of the 25th he hoped and expected that the *Declaration* would induce acceptance of his offer to Massa, but in this he was disappointed. Captain Mahan, on the other hand, misunderstanding—so it seems to me—"se vi è da sperare," and overlooking the fact that the letter to Massa and the proclamation were also written this same evening, supposes that "the Cardinal anticipated from it (the *Declaration*) either a surrender at discretion or an outburst of despair."

[1] Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34,944, 238.

Eccellenza.

La lettera ai Castelli sarà andata a questa ora, e se vi è da sperare che si diano a discrezione, potrà succedere, perchè vedono l'aumento della forza, e qualora volessero attacare, sarà bene che ci trovino in forza per distruggerli. Imploro dunque da V. E. che faccia sbarcare 1200 uomini, i quali sarebbe bene di metterli a portata di andare poi a S. Elmo, e perciò offerisco per lor quartiere la mia Casa, che è ben grande e vacata, la quale è situata al largo dello Spirito Santo: si chiama il palazzo della Bagnara, è anche difficile ad esser toccata dalla bomba, ciò dico p(er) il riposo dei soldati. Spero che V. E. mi favorirà, giacchè questa sera vi sono già state delle ostilità di S. Elmo, e non vi è tempo da perdere. Sono con il maggiore rispetto, e profonda stima

Di V. E.

P. della Madalena 25 Giugno 1799.

Devtmo servitor vero

F. CARD. RUFFO V. GLE.

S. E. il C. Amml. Nelson.

[2] This is clearly shown by Nelson's promise, presently quoted, that he would not break the armistice with the two castles.

remaining that of desperates, ready, in the event of attack, to get the hostages in S. Elmo hung,[1] and to blow themselves and the castles up together.[2]

June 26th.—Very early in the morning Ruffo received intelligence which rendered a maintenance of the present state of things still more insupportable, and the necessity for reinforcements still more urgent. He wrote to Nelson as follows :—

"News comes to me from Capua that the Jacobins and French of that place, finding themselves reinforced by the desperate fugitives of Naples, have attacked the troops commanded by Gambs, taken the cannon and powder and killed many . . . and they approach Caserta. See, your Excellency, what need there is to disembark troops to terminate the affair of Naples, and not leave the country exposed to ruin. . . . The help should be immediate."[3]

Nelson, who hitherto had apparently been not ill-pleased that Ruffo should find himself in straits, and had left him unaided, could withhold help no longer, now that the royal cause would thereby suffer detriment. There is evidence that he authorised Hamilton to reply "that his Lordship was ready to give him every

[1] On the 26th we find Marshal Micheroux, one of the four hostages in S. Elmo, writing to his cousin the Cavaliere :—

"Here there is general grief at the delay in the departure of the patriots, and especially after the intimation received from Nelson, on account of which they, fearing some act of violation, threatened yesterday to propose to the commandant to hang the hostages—first the two bishops, then myself and Dillon. With such intelligence I beg you to hasten the execution of this article, especially as the weather is favourable; and in case it should not be possible, from some obstacle, to execute it at once, there might be some official confirmation, so as to obviate the danger in which I stand" (Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34,950, 75).

[2] *Cf. e.g. Diario*, June 26: "It is understood that the Jacobins refuse to quit. . . . News that there is a fear of mines under the castles."

[3] Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34,944, 250.

Eccellenza.

Mi vengono nuove da Capua, che trovandosi rinforzati i Giacobini e Francesi di Capua, dai disperati fugitivi di Napoli, hanno attaccata la truppa comandata da Gambs, presole tutto il cannone le polveri, ed uccisole molta gente, e tutti fugati in quei circonvicini monti, hanno ripresa perciò S. Ma. di Capua, e si avvicinano a Caserta. Veda V. E. di quanta necessità sia la Truppa, che potrebbe sbarcare, per terminare l'affare di Napoli e non lasciaer esposto il paese alla rovina. Rimetto a V. E. la disposizione di tutto, e potrà passare i suoi ordini al Capº Gente duca della Salandra, ma gli ajuti devono essere immediati. Sono con tutto il respetto, e profonda stima

Di V. E.

Pte della Madalena 26 Guigno 1799.

Devtmo servitor vero

F. CARD. RUFFO V. GLE.

S. E. il Contrammiraglio Nelson.

assistance of which the fleet under his command was capable, and which his Eminence thought necessary."[1] But it would seem that this letter also conveyed an impression to Ruffo's mind that Nelson was meditating some *coup-de-main.* In no other way can one explain Ruffo's *ultimatnm,* despatched apparently at this juncture :—

"That if he (Nelson) would not recognise the treaty of capitulation of the castles of Naples, in which, among the other contractors, an English official had solemnly intervened in the name of the King of Great Britain, the whole responsibility would rest upon him (Nelson) alone. And that, suspending the execution of the treaty, the Cardinal was putting back the enemy into the state in which they found themselves previous to the said treaty, and that finally he would withdraw his troops from the positions last occupied, and would entrench himself with all his force, leaving the English to conquer the said enemy by themselves."[2]

Nor did Ruffo confine himself to words, but at once put his threat into execution. He sent a copy of Nelson's *Opinion* into both the castles, and at the same time announced the evacuation of the approaches to Nuovo, which, at the request of the rebels themselves, had been occupied by the Russians on the 23rd.[3] A terrible panic at once commenced in the city.[4]

At this critical moment, after well pondering the matter, Nelson authorised Hamilton to send Ruffo the following reassurance :—

"Lord Nelson begs me to assure your Eminence that he is resolved to do nothing which can break the armistice which your Eminence has accorded to the chateaux of Naples."[5]

[1] *Infra,* 25.

[2] Sacchinelli, 254. It is possible that this *ultimatum* may belong to the 25th (*cf. supra,* 99), but if so, there was a practical renewal of it at this moment, as is shown by the *Compendio.* The hour of despatch seems to have been *daybreak* (*infra,* 41),

[3] *Compendio* :—"On the morning of the 23rd the rebels themselves requested that the Russian troops should occupy and surround all the upper entrances of the castle (Nuovo) and the Palazzo."

[4] Ibid.

[5] Sacchinelli, 255. Captain Mahan explains that, having *finally disapproved* of the treaty on the 24th, "there remained the question of the armistice" to be dealt with now. This simple view, however, is open to the objections—

(*a*) That Nelson's personal view on the 24th was not, and could not, be equivalent to a legal annulment of the treaty.

(*b*) That his *Opinion* of the 25th, taken naturally, seems to imply a preservation of the *status quo,* pending the royal decision; if so, it remains to be

Hamilton's letter was brought by Captains Troubridge and Ball,[1] who arrived about 10 A.M.[2] Their function was, judging from their credentials of the 24th, as persons "fully informed of Lord Nelson's sentiments," to explain the import of the letter of which they were the bearers. The account of what happened at the interview between Ruffo and the two captains will be best given in the words of Ruffo's Secretary of State, Sacchinelli:—

"This letter (of Hamilton's) was brought by Captains Troubridge and Ball, who gave in writing the following declaration:—'Rear-Admiral Nelson does not prevent (*non impedisce*) the execution of the capitulation of the castles Nuovo and dell' Uovo.' Troubridge wrote this declaration with his own hand, but did not wish to confirm it, saying that they were commissioned and accredited by the letter of June 24[3] to treat *by word of mouth* about military operations, and not at all *in writing* affairs pertaining to diplomacy. The Cardinal, although he doubted whether there might not be bad faith in this, not wishing to dispute with the two captains, intervened in the matter no further than to charge the minister Micheroux to accompany the two captains to the castles, to concert with the republican commanders the execution of the articles agreed upon.

"Of the transcribed declaration a lithographed fac-simile will be found appended to this volume.

"At the end of some hours Micheroux reported to the Cardinal that, thanks to God, all had been arranged by common accord."[4]

explained how the treaty could be kept in suspense, and the question of the armistice remain open (vide *supra*, 17).

These objections may possibly be surmounted, but it is clear that Hamilton's letter was written with some further object than merely to reassure Ruffo about firing on Naples. For he was writing, be it remembered, not only in response to the *ultimatum*, but also with recognition of Ruffo's warning (above quoted) that any further delay in the evacuation of the castles would be gravely prejudicial to the King's interests.

[1] Sacchinelli, 256. This fact, apparently questioned by Captain Mahan, is confirmed by a letter quoted presently:—"I send *once more* Captains Troubridge and Ball."

[2] *Infra*, 42. Sacchinelli (255) puts the visit a little later, "verso il mezzogiorno."

[3] *Supra*, 14.

[4] Sacchinelli, 256. The Marchese Maresca has drawn attention to the fact that the fac-simile appended differs considerably from the declaration in the text:—

"I capitani Troubridge e Ball hanno autorita per la parte di Milord Nelson di dichiarare a S. Eminenza che Milord non si opporra al Imbarco dei Ribelli e della gente che compone la Guarnigione dei Castelli Nuovo e dell' Ovo."

Moreover, Troubridge did not know Italian, and the handwriting differs from his widely. As a matter of fact, the style points to the interpreter who accompanied the two captains, being similar to that of an English copy, made

Evidently the captains reported to Nelson similarly, for at this juncture he writes to Troubridge :—

"You are hereby required to take on you the charge and command of all his Majesty's marine forces landed from the squadron under my command *in the castles* and city of Naples, as well as of all artillerymen, seamen, and others who may be landed to assist in attacking S. Elmo."[1]

What actually happened at the castles we now know from Micheroux's own lips.[2] In Ruffo's letter charging him to execute the terms of the treaty were enclosed the written pledges of the two captains. He accordingly informed the rebels that Nelson no longer opposed the execution of the capitulation, and he replaced the Russians in the abandoned positions. The rebels prepared to embark with alacrity.[3] By any hesitation, now that embarkation was explicitly allowed, they would have violated the treaty themselves.

And now there seems to be another gap, which strangely enough Sacchinelli does nothing to fill up.[4] If his representation of Ruffo's sentiments be correct, the Cardinal's natural course would at this point have been to write directly to Nelson, explaining that he was dissatisfied with the assurances of the two captains. There seem to be grounds for supposing that he did actually take this course, for we presently find Nelson replying :—

"I am *just* honoured with your Eminence's letter; as his Excellency Sir William Hamilton has wrote you this morning, that I will not on any consideration break the armistice entered into

for Nelson, of one of Ruffo's letters. Under these circumstances, it is quite open to Captain Mahan to reject, as he has done, the declaration in the text as a loose, careless paraphrase of the fac-simile. There is, however, the alternative explanation that the text—which has all the appearance of being made up of notes left by Ruffo—is quite correct, "Rear-Admiral Nelson, &c.," having been really written by Troubridge; and it may be remarked in passing that the signature of the captains would scarcely be necessary for the declaration containing their names. In this case, one may presume that Sacchinelli, lighting on the latter after Ruffo's death, jumped to the conclusion that it was Troubridge's autograph, but left Ruffo's notes unaltered.

[It is after writing the above note that the *Compendio* of Micheroux has been placed in my hands. The *Compendio* mentions more written declarations than one (*infra*, 42), and in his preface to this publication the Marchese Maresca withdraws the suspicions he had expressed as to Sacchinelli's credibility.]

[1] *Despatches*, iii. 388. This letter is dated the 26th, and therefore, according to the nautical reckoning, must have been written before noon.

[2] *Infra*, 42.

[3] Albanese, *infra*, 33. Some even seem to have been on board by noon (*Diario*, June 26).

[4] Due perhaps to the fragmentariness of the notes left by Ruffo.

by you, *I hope your Eminency will be satisfied that I am supporting your ideas.* I send once more Captains Troubridge and Ball to arrange with your Eminency everything relative to an attack on S. Elmo; whenever your army and cannon are ready to proceed against it, I will land 1200 men to go with them under the present armistice. I have only to rejoice that his Britannic Majesty's fleet is here, to secure the city of Naples from all attacks by sea. I am, &c., NELSON."[1]

Of this second interview between Ruffo and the captains we know nothing; but it may be inferred that arrangements were made as to the proportion of the 1200 who were to be landed at once.

Apparently synchronising with this second mission of the two captains, one finds the following letter of Hamilton's to Acton :—

"Your Excellency will have seen from my last letter that the views of the Cardinal and Lord Nelson were not at all of accord. At length, after good reflection, Lord Nelson authorised me to write to his Eminence yesterday morning[2] quickly to assure him that he would do nothing to break the armistice which his Eminence had thought fit to conclude with the rebels shut up in the forts Nuovo and dell' Uovo, and that his Lordship was ready to give him every assistance of which the fleet under his command was capable, and which his Eminence thought necessary for the good service of his Sicilian Majesty. This produced the best effect possible. Naples had been upside down in fear that Lord Nelson would break the armistice.[3] Now all is calm. The Cardinal has arranged with Captains Troubridge and Ball

[1] *Despatches*, iii. 394, where, however, the letter is misdated. Captain Mahan has assumed that the letter of Ruffo's, to which this is a reply, was that quoted on p. 20, which somehow had only just arrived! Twenty hours' delay in a matter of such urgent importance is not very likely, and when we consider all that had passed in the interval (notice especially the letter about Capua), such a supposition appears to me incredible. It is not the least of Captain Mahan's faults that he treats the relics of Ruffo's correspondence in the British Museum as though they were the whole. We find that the *ultimatum* is missing, also a letter which accompanied the Russo-Turkish protest (Rose, i. 237), also the letters of thanks to Nelson and Hamilton (Sacchinelli, 259; Dumas, iv. 87–9); and the chances appear to me strong that here we have evidence of another letter missing too.

An attempt has been made, I see, to postpone Nelson's letter to the evacuation of Nuovo and dell' Uovo, but this must, I think, be abandoned, because—

(*a*) The words "As Sir W. Hamilton wrote this morning" indicate a continuance of the same situation.

(*b*) The expression "I will land 1200" could scarcely have been used after so large a portion of the 1200 as 500 had been already landed (vide *infra*, 28).

[2] Nautical dating = this morning. Alternatively, it may be that Dumas, in translating Hamilton, misunderstood the nautical scope of "27th," and attempted a correction here.

[3] *Cf. Diario*, June 26.

that the rebels get embarked this evening, while 500 marines will be landed to garrison the two castles."[1]

4 P.M.—"Landed 500 marines, and Troubridge went on shore to take command."[2] They "took possession of the lower forts, and embarked the Jacobins on board of transports."[3]

6 P.M.—Minichini, deputed for this office by Micheroux, receives the formal surrender of dell' Uovo, in accordance with the terms of the treaty; and a *verbale* recording the transaction, and guaranteeing the departure that evening of the thirty-four remaining non-emigrants, is signed by him and the commander of the place, L'Aurora :—

"At the embarkation on the first ship, the Signor Brigadier has taken possession with twelve men of the barrier; at embarkation on the second, possession of the casemate; at embarkation on the third, which carried the baggage of those departing, possession of the position."[4]

Ruffo writes to Hamilton thanking him for using his moderating influence, and saying what a relief it is to his mind that things are now arranged. He also writes cordially to Nelson and Lady Hamilton.[5]

June 27th.—The Cardinal, "full of contentment," attends in state at a solemn thanksgiving in the church *del Carmine.*[6]

Hamilton replies cordially to the Cardinal's note of thanks, minimising Nelson's function, and without a word about the transports :—

"EMINENCE,—It is with great pleasure that I receive your Eminence's note. We have all worked alike for the service of

[1] Dumas, iv. 87–9. [2] *Foudroyant's* log. [3] *Culloden's* log.

[4] Sacchinelli, 257. The Marchese Maresca has expressed some doubt as to the *verbale* owing to its laborious formality—it is, in fact, a little super-capitulation—and to the fact that a day or two later Minichini was obliged to ask Nelson's permission to inspect dell' Uovo, then under British control. But the following considerations deserve attention :—

1. That Hamilton's reference in his despatch of July 14, "Lord Nelson by sending immediately a garrison of marines into Ovo, and one of sailors under Hood into Nuovo," indicates that no officer of distinction was sent to command at the former castle.

2. That Calabresi, as well as English troops, took possession of the castles—so says Petromasi, who was an eye-witness (*Storia della Spedizione;* Naples, 1801, 71).

3. That in any case the exact hour of the arrival of the English at dell' Uovo is unknown, and a slight delay would leave room for Minichini.

4. That if Micheroux had a suspicion of Nelson's *bona fides*, the pragmaticalness of the *verbale* is just what one might expect.

[In his preface to the *Compendio* the Marchese Maresca states that the doubts he had felt have been removed by the document he is publishing.]

[5] Sacchinelli, 254; Dumas, iv. 87–9.

[6] Sacchinelli, 258, 260; *Diario*, June 27.

his Sicilian Majesty and the good cause. Different characters have different ways of expressing themselves. Thanks to God, all goes well, and I can assure your Eminence that Milord Nelson congratulates himself on *the decision he has taken not to interrupt your Eminence's operations*, but to assist you with all his power to terminate the affair which your Eminence has so well conducted until the present in the very critical circumstances in which your Eminence has been placed.

"Milord and I are too happy to have contributed *a little* to the service of their Sicilian Majesties, and to the tranquillity of your Eminence.

"Milord begs me to thank your Eminence for your note to him, and that he will see to it for getting the provisions.—Your Eminence's very humble, &c., W. HAMILTON."[1]

Lady Hamilton receives a note from the Queen :—

"No signs of life from the Cardinal since the 17th. . . . I trust all to you."[2]

Hamilton resumes his letter to Acton of the previous afternoon :—

"over which the flag of his Sicilian Majesty is now floating, while the flags of the short-lived republic are standing in the cabin of the *Foudroyant*.[3] We were in Lord Nelson's launch when the marines disembarked. The joy was extreme. And when we took possession of the castles there was a *feu de joie* all over Naples. . . . It has been necessary for me to interpose between the Cardinal and Lord Nelson. If not, all would have gone wrong from the first. And the Cardinal has written to thank me. ('To me as well as Sir William,' interpolates Lady Hamilton.) The abominable tree of liberty, over against the Palazzo Reale, has been thrown down, and the Phrygian cap from the head of the giant. *The rebels who are on board the polaccas cannot move without a passport from Lord Nelson.*[4] Caracciolo and twelve others of these infamous rebels will shortly be given into his hands."[5]

Nelson and Ruffo, working in cordial harmony, make arrangements for attacking S. Elmo and the other forts

[1] Sacchinelli, 258–9.
[2] Pettigrew, i. 232.
[3] The change of tense marks the suture. It would be gratifying if one could tack on the matter of the flag to the first half of the letter, for then there would be overt proof of an act of surrender to Nelson's terms before the landing of the 500 marines. But it is not till June 27 that the royal flag over the castles is noted in the *Diario*.
[4] This being, so far as present evidence goes, the first specific mention of a distinction being made between the embarkation and sailing.
[5] Dumas, iv. 87–9.

still holding out,[1] and Hamilton addresses the Cardinal as follows :—

"My Lord Nelson begs me to say to your Eminence that he has no doubt you will agree with him, that, for the service of his Sicilian Majesty, it is necessary that the castle of S. Elmo should be reduced as soon as possible. My Lord proposes then, with the approbation of your Eminence, to send the body of marines, about 1200 men, together with the Russian corps attached to the army of your Eminence, to attack the said castle. My Lord would desire that during the attack your Eminence would place two or three hundred men in the castles of Uovo and Nuovo, and to keep the gates of these forts closed.[2] . . . My Lord begs me to add that if your Eminence judges it expedient to send Caracciolo and the rest of the other rebels to him, according to his proposal yesterday, he will dispose of them."[3]

June 28th.—Letters arrive from the King, the Queen, and Acton apropos of the erroneous intelligence about the twenty-one days' armistice conveyed to them in Nelson's letter of the 23rd.

The Queen writes to Lady Hamilton :—

"*June* 25.

"It is impossible to treat with this scum. It must be put an end to. . . . The King will make an example of the chiefs, and the others will be deported. . . . Finally, a severity exact, prompt, just. The same for the women, and that without pity. . . . There is no need of a council to try them. Their guilt is quite plain and proved. . . . My dear Miladi, recommend Lord Nelson to treat Naples as if it were a rebel town in Ireland. . . . I recommend you then, my dear Miladi, the greatest firmness, force, vigour, rigour. For life, your more than tender, loving, grateful friend."[4]

[1] Sacchinelli, 254.

[2] As marking the horal date of Nelson's letter of the 26th (*supra*, 24), it is of considerable importance to notice that the 1200 were not supplementary to, but inclusive of the 500 already landed. The *Foudroyant's* log fixes the landing of "the remainder of the marines, near 600" on the afternoon of the 29th. When Nelson some days later (see his postscript) wrote to Keith that "on the 27th (according to nautical dating) 1300 men landed from the ships," he referred to the landing on the afternoon of the 26th, and summarised inaccurately. The only other landing that one hears of is that of the two or three hundred troops from the Portuguese ships (*Despatches*, iii. 390). When Mr. H. C. Gutteridge, in the *English Historical Review*, October '99, speaks of 1300 being landed on the 27th, he appears to me to be, as in the case of some other dates, inaccurate.

[3] Rose, i. 237–8. Other republican leaders besides Caracciolo (*cf.* "B. N." 196), having been outside the forts at the time of the capitulation, were regarded by Nelson as not included; and it is evidently to this class that Hamilton refers. As Ruffo, until the 29th at any rate, did not accede, it would seem that his view was contrary. Whether in Caracciolo's case he acceded on the 29th will be discussed presently.

[4] Gagnière's *Maria Carolina*, 185, &c.; Pettigrew, i. 233, &c.

Acton writes to Hamilton :—

"*June* 25.

"I have received your notes dated Sunday, Capri being in sight. . . . The Cardinal was commanded to make a separate classification of the criminals. Some were to be judged militarily if found with arms in their hands. . . . Never any capitulation or conditions could be granted to rebels. . . .[1] The King, far from admitting a capitulation with rebels, or any dishonourable articles with the French—and among these dishonourable ones is to be reckoned a truce of twenty days, so much prejudiciable to his Majesty's interests—disapproves entirely, and writes to the Cardinal that no capitulation is to be made with rebels. . . . Whatever intimation Lord Nelson shall think proper to make,[2] the Cardinal is to abide by it, and every precedent is to be void. . . . His Majesty *confides his authority as to every military operation* and his own dignity into Lord Nelson's hands. . . . His Majesty thinks . . . of making a new director of that kingdom."

"*June* 25, 10 P.M.

"A capitulation is again mentioned as done, but as no letters are arrived from the Cardinal, or anybody at Naples, we do not know what to believe. . . . Every trust is at an end. . . . As soon as the King receives the Cardinal's answers to the letters sent this morning, he must and shall resolve."[3]

On receipt of these letters, Nelson "deduced that his Majesty had quite disapproved,"[4] and authorised Hamilton to write to Ruffo as follows :—

"In consequence of an order which he has just received from his Sicilian Majesty, who disapproves entirely of the capitulation made with his rebellious subjects in the castles of Uovo and Nuovo, he is about to seize and make sure of those who have

[1] Acton's statement has been taken as decisive that, in granting the capitulation, Ruffo acted contrary to explicit orders, and consequently illegally; but this is perhaps going too far. True that such orders or instructions as are here referred to had been given, but they had been modified by others of a milder character. Notice especially the Queen's letter (*supra*, 10) of June 19th, in which she assents to the emigration of *all* the republicans except Caracciolo. Acton's statement proves that as the confidence of the King and Queen increased, their demands went up, and they chose to remember only the severer instructions that they had given. Thus, on June 23rd, when the treaty was signed, Ruffo had the amplest power of amnesty; but whether he had the right to clothe the amnesty in treaty form is another question.

Ruffo's original commission was absolute, and, rightly or wrongly, he maintained that the instructions received were only expressive of the royal wishes, which did not in the last resort limit his final discretionary powers (Lemmi, 100). The point has been worked out by Professor Kossmann of Berlin, who lays stress on the Queen's tone of deference (*supra*, 10).

[2] Presumably to the French and rebels, not the Cardinal.

[3] Lemmi, 92, &c.

[4] Hamilton to Acton (Dumas, iv. 94–6).

left them, submitting to the opinion of your Eminence whether it would not be advisable to publish in Naples the reason of this transaction, and at the same time to warn the rebels who have escaped to Naples from the said castles that they must submit to the clemency of his Sicilian Majesty within the space of twenty-four hours, under pain of death."[1]

Thus one sees that Nelson chose to regard the King's disapproval of the twenty-one days' armistice as equivalent to a rejection of the actual treaty, the terms of which the King had not yet seen, and of the very existence of which, it will be perceived, he was still unaware. Ruffo, however, was by no means deceived. He might well argue that in such a matter *constructive* cancelling was insufficient. And though there was that injunction of abiding by any intimation of Nelson's, yet, strictly speaking, that injunction applied only to the "military operation" contemplated in view of the twenty-one days' armistice. Anyhow—and this is the important point—the 28th witnessed, not a submission on the part of Ruffo, as Signor Lemmi has imagined, but a most distinct recrudescence of opposition to Nelson's proceedings. He refused to publish the proposed proclamation (and for the day Nelson yielded in the matter).[2] So far from complying, he issued a proclamation of quite contrary tenor, forbidding any arrests without his personal authority. So marked was this attitude that among the ultra-royalists there was a talk of arresting him.[3] And he wrote off to Palermo tendering his resignation, and "dwelling on the scandal which non-observance of the treaty would produce."[4]

As to the embarked prisoners, Nelson acted as he had foreshadowed. Early in the morning the signal was given for a boat manned and armed from each ship to attend the polaccas coming out of the mole; and when they had been anchored under English guns, the officers —who, against the strict letter of the treaty, but by a private understanding, it would seem,[5] had retained their side-arms—were disarmed.

At 7 P.M. the chiefs were seized and transferred to

[1] Rose, i. 238–9.
[2] Hamilton to Grenville, July 14; Hamilton to Acton (Dumas, iv. 92).
[3] "L'ultimo foglio del Cardinale e che non si arrestasse persona alcuna senza il di lui ordine che e voler salvare i ribelli. In somma ieri vi fu un contrasto se il Cardinale debba assere arrestato."—Nelson to Acton, June 29 (Dumas, iv. 92).
[4] Sacchinelli, p. 269; Dumas, iv. 118.
[5] "B. N." 199.

English ships;[1] the fleet shifting its position in order to cover the polaccas more completely;[2] and at this very hour of the violation of the treaty, Foote quited the bay under orders to Palermo.[3] Nelson's last proceeding on the 28th seems to have been to send an emissary, La Marra, to secretly seize Caracciolo, who was in hiding in a village on the outskirts of Naples, and bring him on board without the Cardinal's knowledge.[4]

June 29th.—Passing over the affair of Caracciolo (put

[1] As an imperfect and misleading extract of the *Foudroyant's* log was recently published by Captain Mahan, the following supplement will not be out of place:—

"A.M.—A quantity of side-arms was brought on board, taken from the prisoners."

"P.M.—Several of the principal rebel officers were brought on board, and put in confinement on board the different ships of the fleet."

Disarmament, it must be remembered, was warranted by the treaty: in contemporary royalist writings like Cimbalo's *Itinerario* (Naples, 1799, 59), and Petromasi's *Storia* (72), stress is laid on the rebels' infraction of treaty terms; whereas the personal seizure—which Albanese's letter (*infra*, 33) fixes more definitely at 7 o'clock—was a distinct violation.

[2] "Alle 23 ore."—*Diario*, June 28–9.

[3] *Seahorse's* log. An attempt has been made to weaken Foote's subsequent evidence on the ground that "he witnessed a daily infraction of the treaty," and made no protest at the time. But, as above shown, this is a mistake. His departure synchronised with the violation exactly. Isolated on ship-board, he could not know what was going on. He had not been asked to join in the Russo-Turkish protest, possibly owing to absence at Procida (*Despatches*, iii. 387), or to the terms in which it was couched. He escaped Albanese's appeal. And the moment he returned to the bay, Nelson wrote, "I wish the *Seahorse* not to anchor. . . . I want to send you directly on service" (*Vindication*, 144).

Much has been made of the fact that at Palermo Foote interceded only for the garrisons of Castellamare and Revigliano, to whom he had granted terms similar to those of Nuovo and dell' Uovo. But this limitation beautifully confirms his defence for his silence, that he did not know of the violation of the treaty with Nuovo and dell' Uovo till long afterwards. He had seen—as he believed—Nelson executing the terms. He interceded for the men whose status seemed to him less safe, being secured only by his own single promise. And it is further noteworthy that he interceded only for the *non-emigrants* of Castellamare and Revigliano.

[4] So states Sacchinelli (266–7), whose description of the whole transaction is exceptionally minute, and seems in exact accordance with the Cardinal's attitude on the evening of the 28th. Great doubt, however, is thrown on Sacchinelli by the fact that the *Diario* puts the arrest on the 25th; and that, as we have seen, Hamilton on the 27th uses language clearly implying that Caracciolo was already in custody. If the *Diario* be correct, Ruffo, though probably a stranger to the arrest, can have been no stranger to the detention. He may have detained the Prince, as he seems to have done Federici, lest he should be *de Witted*. But all that the *Diario* and Hamilton's references actually prove is that there was *report* of arrest on the 25th, and that Hamilton believed that report. It may be noted that the 25th would not square with Ulloa's account (*Annotamenti*, 150, &c.), according to which Ruffo sent Caracciolo word to fly after Nelson's interference with the treaty; and he accordingly fled into the country disguised as a peasant. And it squares but ill with D'Ayala's (*Italiani benemeriti*, 139), who, though he speaks of a detention in prison—perhaps meaning only for a few hours—is equally

on board at 9 A.M., tried at 10,[1] condemned at noon, hung at 5 P.M.[2]): letters arrive from Acton and the Queen. The former writes:—

"We have at last received the infamous convention. His Majesty is to have a ship freighted immediately to send a person to relieve the Cardinal, and order him to come and give account for his disobeying so openly the commands and strict injunctions of his own Sovereign. But before sending over this message, the King expects the news of Lord Nelson's arrival."[3]

The Queen enclosed an annotated copy of the treaty:—

"Dishonour . . . Insolence . . . Infamy . . . Culmination of baseness and cowardice . . . In diametrical opposition to their Sovereign's orders and instructions . . . This treaty is so infamous that if, by a miracle of providence, some event does not arrive to destroy it, I shall consider myself lost and dishonoured."[4]

Nelson now felt himself sufficiently authorised to publish on his own account the before-mentioned proclamation announcing the annulment of the treaty. A promise of mercy, however, was held out to those who presented themselves voluntarily.[5]

clear as to Ruffo's intention to save. What seems to me to confirm Sacchinelli's version is the description by Lieutenant Parsons of the manner in which Caracciolo came on board—escorted not by soldiers, but a disorderly crowd of lazzaroni, and in a hunted, starving condition—not as though he had been some days in one of Ruffo's prisons.

[1] Signor Lemmi finds fault with me for having noted, among other irregularities of the trial, that the *Minerva*, for firing on which Caracciolo was condemned, acted under English orders. But the positive evidence that this was the case until June 13 is complete (*Vindication*, 109, 128, 133, 152).

Strangest of all comments on the trial is Captain Mahan's assumption that an official record—other than Thurn's report to Ruffo—was drawn up with verbatim reports of witnesses, as is the practice in the English navy to-day. That such a practice prevailed in the Sicilian navy a century ago remains to be shown. But in any case the drum-head character of this particular trial leaves little room for such formalities.

[2] I have been attacked for admitting Lady Hamilton's presence at the execution, but here are the facts. Clarke and M'Arthur wrote during her lifetime, "Of her being present there cannot be the least doubt." Similarly Southey, in 1813, writes, "She was present at the execution" (ii. 51). This statement of her presence, *i.e.* watching from the *Foudroyant's* deck, has often been confounded, *e.g.* by Von Helfert, with the later statement, made by Brenton, of her going out in a launch; and the contradictions given to the latter have been wrongly extended to the former. The only rebutting evidence to Clarke and M'Arthur's statement is an amazing story by that well-known post-prandial raconteur Lord Northwick, on which I have already commented sufficiently in the *English Historical Review*.

[3] Lemmi, 95.

[4] Gagnière, 190; Pettigrew, i. 239, &c. With regard to the date of the arrival of this document—as to which Signor Lemmi makes a mistake—see my article, *English Historical Review*, 279.

[5] Cf. *Diario*, Oct. 22:—"To-day the execution of six persons was carried out. . . . After the condemnation Colace made a memorial imploring the

Albanese and other leaders on the polaccas, who had been thrown into consternation by the seizure of their comrades the evening before, send protests to Ruffo and other signatories of the treaty:—

"All the individuals of the garrison who, in virtue of the capitulation, embarked to sail to Toulon, are plunged into the greatest consternation. They looked to the capitulation taking effect in good faith, although, owing to the precipitation of the issue from the castles, the articles were not punctually observed.[1] It is now two days since the wind was propitious. And yesterday evening at 7 o'clock with great grief we saw taken from the ships Manthonè, Massa, &c."[2]

Ruffo, in response, made his last effort by sending Micheroux "to implore Nelson not to sully his glory."[3] He could do no more, for the morning's correspondence from Palermo must have cut away his technical ground for resistance, and the English understanding with the royalists had reduced him to practical impotence.[4]

June 30th.—An autograph letter of the King's arrives, written on receipt of Nelson's of the 24th. "He thanked his Lordship for having saved his honour, approved all that had been done, and sent letters with full powers to appoint a new government, and even to arrest the Cardinal, if Lord Nelson should think it necessary to come to that extremity."[5] These letters it was not necessary to forward to the persons to whom they were addressed. Hamilton was able to inform Acton that friction with the Cardinal had ceased.[6]

royal clemency because it had been promised him on the word of Admiral Nelson, which admitted to the clemency of his Majesty those who presented themselves voluntarily. The same was also asserted by the advocate of the prisoners. But the Attorney-General had another despatch, in which it was said that the promise of pardon made by Nelson could not be attended to. Posterity will pass judgment on such events."

[1] *Cf.* Acton to Hamilton (Lemmi, 101):—"I have seen with the highest consolation what Lord Nelson has done with the rebels, and that no military honours were allowed for these scoundrels." Acton's mode of expression scarcely favours the idea that the letters to Palermo had depicted an unconditional surrender.

[2] Sacchinelli, 262–4. [3] Ibid., 264.

[4] *Cf.* Hamilton to Grenville, July 14; Morrison Letters, 411; "B. N.," 194; Dumas, iv. 92.

[5] Hamilton to Grenville, July 14; *cf.* Lemmi, 96, &c.

[6] Lemmi, 101.

APPENDIX A

HAD the treaty been effectually executed before Nelson's arrival ?

In the *English Historical Review* I brought forward evidence that the hostages (except the four sent into S. Elmo) and the English prisoners had been released; that a considerable part, probably about half, of the garrisons had returned to their homes; and that important strategic positions had been surrendered.[1] To the second and third points—for the first is admitted,[2] though its importance as a guarantee of good faith and fair treatment has been questioned—some further corroboration may now be added.

Hamilton, as we have already seen, in writing to Ruffo on the 28th, refers to

> "the rebels who have escaped to Naples from the said castles."[3]

In his despatch of July 14th he defines the position of this class more explicitly:—

> "And that such of his Majesty's rebel subjects, *who by the Cardinal's treaty might escape with impunity*, might not do so, Lord Nelson published at Naples a printed notification."

Captain Mahan has argued as though these so-called refugees consisted solely of those of the garrisons who quitted in an irregular way while the negotiations were in progress. Even if this were so, however, yet such persons quitted with Ruffo's express guarantee;[4] their position was surely regularised when the treaty was concluded, and Hamilton might well speak of them as covered by it. But it is no sound historical sentiment which has led to the suggestion that the withdrawals, numerous before signature, discontinued afterwards. There is ample evidence that, when Nelson arrived, the number of persons, not intending to emigrate, who still remained in the castles, was comparatively insignificant.[5]

[1] E.H.R., 267, &c.

[2] Except by Professor Laughton:—"The capitulation had not been in any part executed."

[3] *Supra*, 30. [4] *Vindication*, 184. [5] *Supra*, 19.

The departure of the patriots of S. Martino[1] stands in a different category, as it took place apparently after Nelson's arrival, but it may be remarked in passing that the sole reason for regarding such execution as invalidated by Nelson's message to Ruffo of the 24th, is furnished by the unwarranted assumption that at that date Nelson's power to suspend or abrogate the treaty was adequate.

Thus, on the whole, as to the departure of the non-emigrants, it seems to me that the statement in Hamilton's despatch of July 14, on which I previously relied, is sufficiently corroborated :—

"When we anchored, the capitulation had in some measure already taken place . . . the others (the non-emigrants) had already been permitted, with their property, to return to their homes."

Coming now to the third point, the strategic surrender; in the *English Historical Review* I quoted at length the concurrent testimonies of Ruffo, Micheroux, Foote, that such surrender had taken place.[2] The fact that before Nelson's arrival Foote had made use of Nuovo as a temporary detention house for prisoners taken from other forts in the bay is in itself decisive.[3] From the following passage, referring to the time of negotiation, one is helped to understand more exactly the nature of the acts to which Ruffo, Micheroux, Foote, though quite definite, refer only in general :—

"The Cardinal re-established the batteries of the Palazzo Reale, and he re-erected another battery at the extremity of the port, whence one could damage the castle dell' Uovo. The patriots complained as soon as they observed it, and it was replied to them that these works had been made by subalterns without his Eminence's orders, but that they should be destroyed if the capitulation were not concluded."[4]

Evidently these batteries were let remain, for a little later,

[1] *Supra*, 18.

[2] E.H.R., 267, &c. Ruffo's testimony has already been quoted (*supra*, 22). Micheroux's is as follows :—"We are masters of all the forts except S. Elmo, which we are about to attack. This moment the fleet under Admiral Nelson comes into port" (Brit. Mus. Add. MSS., 34, 912). Foote's :—"The truth is that some parts of the agreement had been performed; and actual advantage was afterwards taken of those parts of the capitulation that had been executed to seize the unhappy men, who were thus deceived by the sacred pledge of a capitulation" (*Vindication*, 48).

[The above statements of Micheroux, and Foote, and Ruffo are now explained and fully confirmed by the *Compendio*, vide *infra*, 42.]

[3] Brit. Mus. Add. MSS., 34,912.

[4] "B. N." 97–8.

when a hitch occurred in the negotiations, their existence was again complained of:—

"If these propositions were rejected, the batteries erected during the armistice must be demolished." [1]

Whether in addition to these three points of execution there was yet a fourth point—whether some partial embarkation, perhaps of about a hundred republicans, took place on the evening of the 23rd—is a question on which I formerly thought some light was thrown by a certain coincidence in the otherwise untrustworthy evidence of Pepe, Colletta, and Botta.[2] But the weighty opinion of the Marchese Maresca has been expressed against me.[3]

As to the other three points, however, the evidence here and previously adduced in the *English Historical Review* does not seem to be reasonably contestable. So cautious a writer as the Marchese Maresca speaks of it as unanimous. The only objection that has hitherto been taken is Captain Mahan's subterfuge that the time stipulated in article 2 for the execution of the treaty had not arrived:—

"The troops composing the garrisons shall retain their forts (conserveranno i loro forti) until the vessels . . . are ready to sail."

Now, in the first place, as to the non-emigrants, some were so anxious to quit that, as before said, they even anticipated the signature; and Ruffo was so anxious to get them out that he deputed officers to encourage and reassure them, and recommended a similar course to Foote at sea. The debarring interpretation suggested would have been equally distasteful to both contracting parties, who must be taken as the best exponents of what was really meant. And the wording "troops composing garrisons" shows that only the military aspect was regarded. In the second place, as to strategical surrender, it is true enough that the garrisons might have objected to any royalist advance before the polaccas were ready; but article 2 was a favour granted to guarantee them against treachery;[4] and if they chose to waive their rights, as they did in the matter of the batteries, how could that be reckoned contrary to the treaty? A's promise

[1] "B. N." 202.

[2] E.H.R., 272–3. I am indebted to Mr. H. C. Gutteridge for pointing out that Pepe was not, as I thought, in garrison on the 23rd, but a prisoner in Ruffo's hands.

[3] *Arch. stor. nap.*, xxiv. 146.

[4] The Queen's comment on article 2 was as follows:—"This is real insolence. The rebels speak with their king as an equal and with an air of having *the upper* hand of him" (Pettigrew, i. 240).

to pay B £100 does not involve an obligation on B's part to receive that sum from A. Moreover, to conclude the matter, there is every reason to believe that the condition "until the polaccas be ready to sail" was already fulfilled before Nelson's arrival; for there is Foote's order to the captain of the *Bulldog*, given some time earlier than 7 A.M. on the 24th, to take charge of "the polaccas on board of which the republicans are about to embark."[1]

APPENDIX B

Of sadder interest than the earlier phases of the execution of the treaty is the question suggested by the embarkation on the 26th.

(*a*) Why should Nelson's promise that he would not break the "armistice" have produced the effect that it did? One could understand a threat of attack bringing the rebels out of the castles, but why should a declaration of neutrality?

(*b*) When Ruffo had reminded Massa that the back door of the castles was still available to quit under treaty conditions, why should the rebels prefer to come out unconditionally, as Nelson afterwards averred that they did, "to be hanged or otherwise as their sovereign thought proper"?[2] At Naples they would have been safe like their comrades until the 29th, and, so far as they knew, for good.

(*c*) If the garrisons had surrendered to the King's mercy, the quality of which they knew too well, how could Albanese and his companions have been expecting until the 28th to go to Toulon?

(*d*) What is the meaning of Nelson's words, occurring as they do: "I hope your Eminency will be satisfied that I am supporting your ideas"? Captain Mahan answers that Ruffo's main idea was to save Naples from attack. But after Hamilton's explicit assurance on this point—"His

[1] *Vindication*, 141. In the *Diario*, June 23, one finds: "We have intelligence almost sure that the patriots will be embarked to-night." *Cf.* Petromasi, 70, and Cimbalo, 55, who say that Nelson arrived "mentre i Jacobini doveano imbarcarsi." Captain Mahan's statement that the arrival took place before the transports were ready appears to be quite baseless.

[2] *Despatches*, iv. 232.

Lordship is resolved to do nothing which can break the armistice,"—what futher reassurance on this point could Ruffo have required?

Such are some of the disquieting reflections suggested by the texts above cited. Let us next see how far they are justified by the positive evidence as to a fraud having been actually perpetrated. This positive evidence comes to us from four directions—from Foote, with whom may perhaps be joined Baillie, from Ruffo, from Micheroux, and from the rebels themselves—and it will be well to examine these four sources separately.

Firstly as to Foote:—

"I believe it is but too true that the garrisons of Uovo and Nuovo were taken out of those castles under pretence of putting the capitulation I had signed into execution."[1]

Foote's whole statement, it must be borne in mind, is prefaced by an appeal to all the captains who had served at Naples. He declares that he writes

"with the most perfect assurance that the sea officers to whom I have alluded will not allow their characters to be brought forward in vindication of anything that has the most distant appearance of falsehood, or even anything equivocal."[2]

Why did none of Nelson's captains come forward in his defence? They all of them knew Foote's book. It went through three editions, published while the war was still raging, and the memory of Trafalgar still fresh.[3] There is the significant fact that for more than thirty years Foote's statement remained unchallenged, and was only challenged when he and the other Naples captains had all passed away.

What evidence Foote had for this particular statement, whether he obtained information from Troubridge and Ball, one cannot now say. But at any rate he had seen the manner of the embarkation, in which, by-the-bye, marines from his own ship assisted.[4] And the captains were mostly in a position to draw conclusions from the attitude of the

[1] *Vindication*, 39. *Cf.* ibid., 17, "They might have chosen to sacrifice their existence rather than to have yielded at discretion to those from whom little mercy was to be expected."

[2] Ibid., 29.

[3] Moreover, Foote's statement was thoroughly popularised by Southey:—"under pretence of carrying the treaty into effect."—*Life of Nelson*, 2nd ed. 1814, ii. 47.

[4] *Seahorse's* log.

rebel officers, whether that of genuine surprise or otherwise, when they were arrested on the 28th, and distributed through the fleet.[1]

What is obvious is that events produced a certain impression on Foote's mind, and presumably on the minds of the other captains, but it by no means necessarily follows that that impression was correct. Foote's words, "I believe it is but too true," may be taken as indicating a doubt. And before one can accept his corroboration of the injurious report that was prevalent,[2] we must look to see how far his evidence is substantiated elsewhere.

More valuable than Foote's testimony would be that of the co-signatory Baillie, if we had it direct, since the latter knew better what was going on in Naples, and, as will be seen presently, executed the honours-of-war article when the castles were evacuated.[3] After his protest before quoted,[4] it cannot be thought that Baillie lent himself to what he knew to be a mere mockery, the only effect of which would be to deceive. Unfortunately, all that we have at present is a rather vague statement in the *Diario*, that when the punishment of the republicans of the two forts began, he threatened to withdraw from Naples:—"He could not suffer the execution of those men who, trusting in his word, had *surrendered and capitulated*.[5]

Secondly, as to Ruffo:—

In the early forties, when Miles and Nicolas re-undertook the task of Nelson's defence, they knew of nothing whatever to corroborate Foote's statement—for the Italian evidence, and Sacchinelli's in particular, which was published in 1836, was completely unknown to them. Moreover, in the face of the *Opinion* and *Declaration* it was diffcult to see any room for bad faith. Accordingly, Foote's charge was dismissed as "a rancorous allegation." Sacchinelli's evidence, however, alters the case materially, for, knowing nothing of Foote's book, he makes exactly the same charge on his own, or rather Ruffo's account, and explains, at least

[1] *Foudroyant's* log.

[2] First voiced in England by Fox, February 3, 1800:—"If the rumours which are circulated be true, they made terms . . . that they should be conveyed to Toulon. . . . They were *accordingly* put on board a vessel; but before they sailed, their property was confiscated, and numbers of them taken out, &c."—*Parliamentary History*, xxiv. 1394. That there was bad faith in embarking the republicans is not clear from Fox's words, but Nelson's reply to Davison (*Despatches*, iv. 232) shows that he understood this charge to be implied, or had heard it otherwise. Consciousness of it is shown again in his letter to Stephens (*Despatches*, iii. 520).

[3] *Infra*, 43.

[4] *Supra*, 16.

[5] *Diario*, Aug. 17.

plausibly, what was otherwise incomprehensible. The inner side of things he was in a position to know, and his narrative at any rate represents the version which Ruffo wished to be accepted.

As already seen from the text, Sacchinelli tells us that, in consequence of the Cardinal's determined and persistent opposition to any infraction of the treaty, Nelson made a feint of giving way, and that Ruffo was deceived by Hamilton's letter of the 26th, and the explanatory assurances of the two captains who brought it.

As to what ensued, there is no question. The rebels came out with arms and baggage as had been agreed upon,[1] the Russians rendering the honours of war,[2] and, at any rate at dell' Uovo, all legal formalities were strictly complied with.[3] The only proceeding of a contrary colour was a withholding of the honours of war on the part of the English.[4] "Finally," says Sacchinelli, clinching his point, "the treaty was violated at sea."[5]

Apart then from Sacchinelli's statements about the pledges, one sees from results that Hamilton's letter conveyed and was intended to convey to Ruffo an intimation that, if he executed the treaty, so far as in him lay, by putting the rebels on board in accordance with its provisions, Nelson would not interfere. And that this was the import of the letter is explicitly proved by Hamilton's subsequent reference to Nelson's "*decision not to interrupt your Eminence's operations.*"[6]

Captain Mahan takes up the line that if Ruffo believed that embarkation implied sailing, he was deceived only because, and just as far as, he chose to be. Ruffo, he says, must have known that the officially delivered *Opinion* could only be cancelled in an equally formal way. This, however, ascribes to the *Opinion* a legal final value in Ruffo's eyes which, if what I have written as to Nelson's powers be correct, it could not have possessed. And, if I have judged the occasion of Nelson's letter of the 26th correctly, then Ruffo did at last obtain a potential cancelling of the *Opinion* in Nelson's own handwriting.

The impression left on my mind is that though Ruffo may have had suspicions, he certainly believed that having got the rebels embarked, moreover with English assist-

[1] *Supra*, 26; *infra*, 42.
[2] *Infra*, 43.
[3] *Supra*, 26.
[4] *Supra*, 33. Acton's words seem to imply that this breach of the capitulation was solitary.
[5] Sacchinelli, 261.
[6] *Supra*, 27.

ance,[1] the treaty would be too far executed to be undone. His letter of thanks to Hamilton, his solemn Te Deum of the 27th (for what proved to be a deep personal humiliation), and his perfect accord with Nelson until the 28th, seem to show that he was deceived, if not completely, yet effectively. And the very marked renewal of opposition to Nelson on the 28th and appeal of the 29th, when he learned that the treaty was to be abrogated, show at any rate that he had not previously—as has been imagined—yielded formally to Nelson's *Opinion* that the royal decision ought to be awaited.

On the other hand, Ruffo's anxiety, as we know now from his letters of the 25th and 26th, to get the castles emptied, was greater than has hitherto been imagined; and it is conceivable that, conformably with his policy of endeavouring to throw all responsibility on Nelson,[2] he contented himself with the knowledge that he would not be interfered with if he embarked the rebels, and forbore to inquire too minutely as to what was to follow.[3] The net result is clear; he shook the tree, and Nelson picked up the fruit.

Thirdly, as to Micheroux :—

Ruffo may conceivably have been deceived because he chose to be, but Micheroux was a still more strenuous stickler for the treaty,[4] and such a choice can scarcely be imputed to him too. Moreover, the *Compendio* was drawn up just after the event, and, being unknown to Sacchinelli, shows us the whole situation from a quite independent point of view. Under such circumstances, few persons will disagree with the Marchese Maresca's verdict, that Micheroux's evidence practically closes the question :—

"*June* 26.—At daybreak a copy of the above-mentioned declaration (Nelson's *Opinion* of the 25th) was sent to each of the castles, together with a note signed by his Eminence and the Russian commandant, to announce that the troops were resuming their former position. But no sooner had the Russians retired from the surroundings of the castle

[1] Evidently Ruffo attached much importance to this point, for Sacchinelli writes (256, 258) :—"The English themselves executed the treaty which before they would not recognise. . . . The Cardinal, full of contentment that the English had not only recognised but themselves executed the treaty, &c."

[2] Hamilton to Grenville, July 14.

[3] These words were written before I had seen the *Compendio*. Now that *both* the pledges reported by Sacchinelli appear genuine, there are but slight grounds for suspecting Ruffo of over-eager credulity. Only lynx-eyed scrutiny would have detected a snare in Troubridge's use of the present tense (*non impedisce*) instead of the future.

[4] *Cf. e.g.* "B. N." 192.

(Nuovo) and from the Palazzo, as far as the Spirito Santo, than there spread through the city an incredible consternation, so that in a few hours thousands and thousands of persons fled from Naples.

"In this state of affairs, what was the motive for which *Lord Nelson suddenly changed his opinion*[1] I do not at all know. I say for certainty, that about ten o'clock his Eminence wrote to me that, Lord Nelson having consented to put the capitulation into effect, I must replace the Russian troops in the evacuated positions.[2] In proof of that, his Eminence sent me as urgent the enclosed documents of Lord Nelson's for the security of the garrisons, but, as the garrisons trusted to my mere word, it was not necessary to make use of them.

"About six in the afternoon, 1200[3] English having been disembarked, there ensued the embarkation of the rebels of Castel Nuovo and Castel dell' Uovo, and the occupation of those forts."[4]

Fourthly, as to the rebels themselves :—

No motive for wishing to be deceived can be imputed to men whose lives were at stake. It will be best to take their testimonies in chronological order.

Albanese's remonstrance of June 29[5] has been treated as a piece of pose on his part. But whether this solution is a valid one, considering this remonstrance in connection with what follows, may be judged by the reader.

On July 3, Moreno petitioned Nelson from polacca No. 6, asserting that he had belonged to Nuovo, and consequently was included in the capitulation :—

"Yesterday there came a visitor to examine the trunks, to see if there were any money there. He threw my linen and clothes and my wife's to the bottom of the filthy hold. This is nothing compared with the loss of my pair of English pistols, which he seized. Sir, *when I embarked, it was promised me that none of my property should be touched.* The pistols were not only prized by me, but had intrinsic value. . . . I pray then for restitution. I give you my word of honour not to make use of them.

[1] Captain Mahan has vigorously attacked me for saying that Nelson executed "a complete *volte-face*" on the 26th, but lo ! here is the proof of it. He has proved the continuity and consistency of Nelson's policy only by passing over such documents (*e.g.* Ruffo's *ultimatum* and the *verbale*) as interfere with his contention.

[2] *Cf.* Ricciardi and D'Avanzati's statement as to the Porta Reale (*infra*, 43).

[3] Vide *supra*, 28.

[4] *Arch. stor. nap.*, xxiv. 460.

[5] *Supra*, 33.

I promise you that they shall be locked up at the bottom of my trunk as before." [1]

The naïveté of the letter, and of a subsequent one two days later, in which Moreno returns to the charge,[2] seems to preclude the idea of pose. His letter at any rate proves that the rebels embarked bag and baggage as the treaty provided.

Landini, on July 9, writing to Nelson from polacca 3, uses much the same tone:—

"Amongst those who embarked on the polaccas to be taken to Toulon was myself. The anarchy which prevails in Naples, and my having served the republic and my duties, oblige me to make this voyage." [3]

And he proceeds to ask Nelson for a few minutes' interview. Of any consciousness of a surrender of treaty rights previous to, or involved in the act of embarkation, there is still no trace.

On July 20 or thereabouts, Ricciardi and Davanzati, ex-officials of the republic, memorialised Nelson formally:—

"After the arrival in this bay of the British fleet the treaty was begun to be put in execution. On their sides, the garrisons of the castles set at liberty the prisoners of state and ten English prisoners of war, and gave into the power of his British Majesty's troops the gate of the Palazzo Reale. And on the other side the troops of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias attended the departure of the garrisons with the honours of war, on the side of the Marine Arsenal where they grounded their arms, and embarked on the ships to be taken to Toulon. By these transactions the articles of the capitulation have been ratified by Russia and England, the troops of which powers have received the prisoners, and taken possession of the gates of the castles. It is twenty-four days since we have been detained in the bay." [4]

It has been pointed out that there is a mistake here—a mistake afterwards corrected by Ricciardi himself [5]—in post-dating the release of the hostages to Nelson's arrival; but this only serves to emphasise the fact that the memorialists seemingly show unconsciousness of any action of Nelson's which invalidated the effect of subsequent execution, and proceed to recount the embarkation without

[1] Brit. Mus. Add. MSS., 34,945, 20.
[2] Ibid., 40. [3] Ibid., 55.
[4] H. M. Williams' *Sketches*, ii. 320–1.
[5] *Memoria*, *Arch. stor. nap.*, xiii. 72–3.

any breach. And in his subsequent statement Ricciardi brings this point out somewhat more clearly, for, in recounting the sudden seizure of the polaccas, he proceeds:—

"If the treaty was executed thus for those patriots who were at sea, one feared no better lot for those who remained in the castles, who, on faith of the treaty, reckoned already on restoration to their homes."[1]

On July 9, L'Aurora addresses Nelson, evidently for the second time:—

"I was commandant of the Castle dell' Uovo, in the capitulation I agreed to, that together with the garrisons I should be conveyed to Toulon. I beg you be so good as to order my embarkment."[2]

To the same effect Massa, who, when he was tried on August 18, declared that it was the *capitulation* that had ruined the republicans, and uses language incompatible with any other conclusion than that he quitted Nuovo believing it to be in force:—

"That what grieved him was that he had sacrificed so many for that capitulation, since it was he who did it, but that he had trusted to the word of five kings, who could not, he thought, fall short of their word. 'I,' he said, 'had powder, bullets, cannon, men were not lacking—what was to prevent my holding on in the castle? At the worst I could have blown everything up into the air, but I should not be condemned to death as a Jacobin."[3]

Next we come to the evidence of Bocquet, one of the

[1] *Arch. stor. nap.*, xiii. 73. It is perhaps worth while comparing this statement with that in the text of H. M. Williams' *Sketches* (i. 181), which the authoress derived from Ricciardi:—"Lord Nelson arrived. . . . The patriots evacuated their forts, and embarked on the transports prepared for their conveyance to France. . . . The next day (really two days after) the transports were moored alongside the English fleet, each under the cannon of an English vessel."

[2] Brit. Mus. Add. MSS., 34,950, 69:—

"Milord—Je connois que vos momments sont precieux, qu 'il absorbent tout le temps de la journee, c'est par cette raison que je me presente *encore* a votre souvenir. J'etoit command^t en fort d'Oeuf dans la capitulation je convenu que conjonctement a la garnison je serois conduit à Toulon comme la garnison de Capoue va partir. Je vous prie d'avoir la bonte d'ordonner aussi mon embarquement, ma sante n'etant pas bonne, et mon equipage totalement pille me meitent dans une position la plus desagreable, qui merite quelques egard. Je vous prie milord ammiral de croire que je l'honneur d'être avec la plus profond respect.

Lundi soir, L'ex Command^t du fort,
Bord le vaisseau Zealous. L'AURORE."

[3] *Diario*, Aug. 18. Massa's words are corroborated by the diarist's comment previous (Aug. 17), that the public generally took it ill that the capitulation should not be observed, "since the rebels had the forts in their hands, and were able to hold out, and injure the city."

patriots in S. Elmo, who composed his *Memoria* a few months after the event :—

"Instead of setting sail for Toulon, unexpected orders, emanating from bad faith, came to check the sweet consolation to which these unfortunates had abandoned their wounded spirits. The anchors were cast, and this was the signal of the violation of the treaty."

And again :—

"We had expected to see the Neapolitans depart who had embarked some days before, but our cheerfulness departed when we learned that it had been decided to insert in the first capitulation (*i.e.* that with Nuovo and dell' Uovo) the most horrible article of the second (*i.e.* that with S. Elmo), viz. that of consigning to the allies of his Silician Majesty all his subjects."[1]

Following Bocquet comes Lomonaco writing in 1801 :—

"In virtue of the treaty (In vigore del trattato) the republicans were embarked on the polaccas, but instead of setting sail they were shut up in the bay. . . . Méjan should have obliged the perjured Ruffo to let those who had capitulated depart without any delay. He should have threatened the destruction of Naples if in a set time their departure should not be effected, and the capitulation executed in all the other articles. S. Elmo could be for the city like Vesuvius in eruption."[2]

And again :—

"The convention was executed by the republicans in all its articles. . . . *Capitolati* who should set sail, &c."[3]

Similarly Coco, who, however, stands on a lower level, being, I think, absent from Naples at the moment, and ill-informed on many points. Still, considering Coco's date, and his relationship with several of the republicans in the forts, his testimony is worth notice :—

"The transport of those who had embarked for departure was stopped ;"[4]

and, evidently understanding the embarkation as an execution of the capitulation, he inveighs against Nelson's treating the capitulation as "legitimate in one part and not in another." When resolved not to maintain the promises

[1] Vide Conforti's *La Republica Napolitana e l'Anarchia Regia.*
[2] *Rapporto al Carnot*, Naples, 1861, 10.
[3] Ibid., 53, 54.
[4] *Saggio Storico*, 1st ed. 1800, ii. 245–6.

given to the republicans, it was "necessary to restore to them all that which they had resigned on the faith of those promises."

On much the same level as Coco stands "B. N. témoin oculaire":—

"The evacuation having been made, few of the patriots regained their houses, and the greater number took the road of the port, and embarked on the vessels destined for their transport. . . . Already they had parted from the port,[1] furnished with money and effects which their families had provided, when to their great surprise ('contre toute attente') they found themselves conducted under the batteries of the castle dell' Uovo, and chained two and two. Complaining of this violence and of the infraction of the treaty, there was read to them an edict of the King, who had just arrived in the bay on Admiral Nelson's ship. His Majesty declared that he had never had the intention of granting a capitulation to his rebel subjects, and that he had never granted such a power to Cardinal Ruffo, and, in consequence, he ordered that they should be carefully guarded, since they had nothing to hope from his clemency. This proclamation was a thunderbolt for the patriots, who forefelt all the evils for which they were reserved.[2] Still they presented to Admiral Nelson a carefully-drawn-up Memorial (evidently Ricciardi and Davanzati's), in which they demanded his execution of a treaty in which England had been a party, since it was signed by Commandant Foote."[3]

Whatever B. N.'s chronological inaccuracies, at any rate the

[1] At first I thought this to be a mistake, but it is literally correct. On the 28th, as the English logs report, the polaccas were attended or towed out of the mole, and doubtless the prisoners at first believed that that measure was preparatory to departure.

[2] What these evils were, and how far Nelson misrepresented his country, is sufficiently indicated by the following passage from such an unexceptionable authority as the *Annual Register* (1799, 292):—"It is painful to relate that the Court of Naples chose rather to adhere to the second than to the first capitulation. A special commission was appointed, which pronounced sentence of death, without much formality, on such as had taken an active part in the late revolutionary government. A dreadful scene of executions ensued, or rather a massacre of the most distinguished among the patriots, in which even some noble ladies were sacrificed to a spirit of vengeance and an awakened thirst of blood. Almost the whole of the late legislative and executive commissioners perished by the hands of executioners."

Nelson had received instructions from Keith, it must be remembered, to use all his power on the side of moderation and mercy (*Vindication*, 87). Short of accepting Professor Laughton's notion that the royalist atrocities were "on the whole just," there is no alternative but to agree with Professor Villari, that "the vendetta was as stupid as it was cruel," and that in opening the way for and countenancing it, "Nelson disgraced his name, did a grave wrong to his country, and injured the cause of the Bourbons, whom Ruffo honestly desired to save" (*Nuova Antalogia*, Feb. 1899).

[3] "B. N." 204–5. On the character of B. N.'s evidence, vide *supra*, 18.

main point stands out clear that the republicans embarked, as they believed, under treaty conditions, and, when at sea, were genuinely surprised at the non-observance of those conditions.

To conclude the evidence on the republican side. There is the before-mentioned evidence of Pepe, Colletta, and Botta as to embarkation before Nelson's arrival.[1] And whether or not any substratum of truth underlies such a representation, the point here to be noted is that it is invariably as an execution of the treaty that the republicans represent the embarkation. No one complains of any enforced surrender to the King's clemency. It is the 28th and not the 26th that the republicans fasten upon.

That there is not more evidence on the republican side, and that there are some discrepancies in what we have, may be accounted for by the fact that over a hundred of the *capitolati*, including nearly all the leaders, were executed. But when one considers the evidence that we have—the close agreement as to the main point between testimonies for the most part quite independent, clinched as it is by Foote and Ruffo (per Sacchinelli), and above all Micheroux —the conclusion seems almost irresistible that a fraud was actually committed. There is only one way of avoiding this conclusion, and that is by assuming with Captain Mahan that when the two captains visited the forts on the 26th, they explained the distinction between embarking and sailing, and that the garrisons then suddenly made an act of surrender to Nelson's terms, which a few hours before they had rejected.[2] Such an explanation was as necessary to prevent mistake as in the case of promising a man food without permission to eat it. But does the foregoing evidence leave room for such an invention?

Nelson, when afterwards accused, adduced only his *Opinion* and *Declaration* of the 25th. Ruffo, instead of admitting that a fraud had been perpetrated, might have cleared his honour at once, if he had been able to point out that the rebels had surrendered their treaty rights themselves. More impressive still is the fact that no mention of surrender is made by the contemporary royalist writers, who, in their search to show that the King recovered Naples unconditionally "as conqueror," represent the castles as having been taken on the 26th by storm![3]

[1] *Supra*, 36. [2] *Supra*, 21.

[3] D. G. Vivenzio (*Ragguaglio storico-critico*, Naples, 1799, 10), D. F. Apa (41), and Durante (*Diario storico*, Naples, 1800, 83). Similarly, but not quite so untruthfully, Cimbalo (56) and Petromasi (71) speak of the rebels being "dislodged."

No; in the present regrettable default of any evidence to justify Captain Mahan's assumption,[1] and in the face of the contrary evidence that exists, surrender to Nelson's terms cannot reasonably be presumed, and Southey's verdict of eighty-seven years ago still holds good :—

"A deplorable transaction, a stain upon the memory of Nelson and upon the honour of England. To palliate it would be in vain; to justify it would be wicked. There is no alternative for one who will not make himself a participator in guilt but to record the shameful story with sorrow and with shame."

[1] Except of course the *a priori* argument from Nelson's usual humanity and uprightness. The following extracts will show within what limits that argument is applicable for the present period. He speaks of the French and their partizans as "infidels, robbers, and murderers: their measure of iniquity is nearly full, and God is in the act of punishing them" (*Despatches*, iii. 346). To another correspondent, "Your news of the hanging of the thirteen Jacobins gave us great pleasure, and the three priests will, I hope, soon dangle on the tree best adapted to their weight of sins"; the sentiment in this case being the more remarkable from his knowledge that at Procida, where these thirteen had been condemned, prisoners were often not present during trial (ibid., 358). Again, "Our friend Troubridge had a present the other day of the head of a Jacobin, and makes an excuse, the weather being hot, for not sending it here" (ibid., 347). On another occasion he even stoops to "Exact as degrading terms as it is in your power to give. No covered wagons. No protection for rebels" (ibid., 413).

Sicilian attentions had won him over entirely. "The King is all goodness," he writes, and "Who could withstand the request of such a Queen?" "She is truly a daughter of Maria Theresa." "I declare to God my sole study is how best to meet her approbation" (ibid., 144, 155, 166, 168). He owned himself the liegeman of Ferdinand as well as of his proper sovereign, and spoke of stabbing any one who should suggest a possible divergence of duties (ibid., iv. 104).

Lady Hamilton's share in bringing about this attitude need not here be discussed. All she could do was to blow on a coal already lighted. But the amazing letters addressed to her in July by Wade are worth quotation, as showing Nelson's atmosphere:—

"I have here your friend Monsignore Gambone, and as he has some propriety, I have put two miserable fellows in the same prison to share his meals. . . . Not so many of these deluded people have been tied up as was expected. . . . The Junto gets to work so slowly. . . . If the hangman does not make his fortune now, I hope he will never meet so favourable an opportunity. . . . The object while present calls forth the tenderness of the wife, the father, the mother; but when it no more exists, the wife cries for half-an-hour, the mother a day, and the father employs the same time to console the old woman, and thus the object is forgot" (Morrison Letters, 419, 429).

Printed by BALLANTYNE, HANSON & Co.
Edinburgh & London

DAVID NUTT, Foreign, Theological, Classical, and Educational Publisher and Bookseller, formerly of 270-271 Strand (from 1849 to 1900), has now removed to

Nos. 57-59 Longacre

3 6105 011 796 229

STANFORD UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES
STANFORD AUXILIARY LIBRARY
STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 94305-6004
(650) 723-9201
salcirc@sulmail.stanford.edu
All books are subject to recall.
DATE DUE

AUG 18 2001
OCT 15 2001
SEP 04 2001
NOV 07 2001
OCT 02 2001
OCT 15 2001